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 This Article examines, from a comparative perspective, how 
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes takes 
place and whether it is constitutionally admissible. Since constitutions 
and statutes rarely deal expressly with this issue, courts may have to 
determine whether or not such deference is permitted, and, if so, 
whether generally or in certain cases only. The constitutional, legal, 
and judicial context prevailing in each country is particularly 
important in this regard. Nevertheless, it may provide courts with little, 
if any, guidance on the specific issue of deference to administrative 
statutory interpretation. In this respect, a nuanced approach along all 
or part of the following lines may be appropriate: When (i) in light of 
the applicable methods and canons of construction, a statute allows a 
margin of interpretation, (ii) the administrative interpretation of the 
statute remains within this margin, and (iii) the applicable 
international, constitutional, statutory or other constraints permit or, 
at least, do not exclude judicial deference either generally or in the case 
at hand, then courts may or, depending on the country, must defer to 
the administrative interpretation of the statute, especially when or, 
depending on the country, provided that (iv) this interpretation requires 
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non-legal expertise, (v) the administrative body enjoys an asymmetry of 
such expertise as compared to courts, and (vi) the legislature was or 
should have been aware of both this necessity and this asymmetry. The 
level of courts’ expertise in the relevant subject-matter should, in 
principle, be determined after taking account of the measures available 
to judges, including the appointment of experts. The proposed test may 
notably be followed where the disputed interpretation requires a 
prediction, appraisal or assessment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Different decision-making bodies make administrative decisions. 
Agencies with some—substantial or limited—independence from 
government exist, for instance, in several democratic countries. Those 
agencies’ officials and staff are usually specialists with profound 
knowledge of the field for which they are responsible. One of their tasks 
consists of interpreting and applying the statutes that they administer. 
Agencies belong to the executive branch of the government and form 
functionally separate units within this branch. They may be numerous 
in some countries, like France, 1  and few in others, such as in 
Germany.2  
This Article deals with administrative decisions, that is, decisions 
taken by administrative bodies or decision-makers, in particular by 
agencies. Several ideas in this Article may actually apply to the 
executive branch in its entirety, including to the head of state or 
government. Nonetheless, courts and scholars have specifically dealt 
with the interpretation of statutes by agencies or other administrative 
bodies and subsequent review of this interpretation by courts. The bulk 
of judicial decisions and scholarly publications are of great interest, 
particularly from a comparative perspective. Administrative decisions, 
with some exceptions, can be appealed to courts. Most judges hear 
cases on a wide range of issues and, accordingly, may be considered as 
generalists. However, legal interpretation is one of their core 
 
1. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
2. See, e.g., Georg Hermes, Abhängige und unabhängige Verwaltungsbehörden: 
Ein Überblick über die Bundesverwaltung [Dependent and Independent Administrative 
Authorities: An Overview of the Federal Administration], in UNABHÄNGIGE 
REGULIERUNGSBEHÖRDEN [INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES] 53, 85–86 
(Johannes Masing & Gérard Marcou eds., 2010). The German Federal Constitutional 
Court considers that “the establishment of independent agencies does not . . . meet with 
any fundamental objections, but remains precarious from the democratic imperative’s 
perspective.” Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 
30, 2019, 151 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202, 
295 (Ger.). 
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competencies—if not their main competency.3 While reviewing a case, 
judges may have to assess the administrative interpretation of a 
statute. Broadly speaking, the judiciary examines a decision of the 
executive based on an act emanating from the legislature. The 
separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and balances 
form the backdrop of this subject. 
Judicial review of administrative decisions often raises the 
question of deference from courts. There can be many instances of 
judicial deference in a single country,4 which overlap to a certain or 
greater extent. 5  The distinction between these various types of 
deference is the subject of scholarly critique in certain jurisdictions. 
Some scholars plead for a clearer, more unified understanding of the 
notions of administrative discretion and judicial deference. 6  This 
Article’s aim is not to elaborate a typology in this regard. Suffice it to 
say, even after simplifying the approach for considering administrative 
discretion and judicial deference, these scholars usually acknowledge 
that the latter would still relate to statutory interpretation,7 among 
other elements. 
 
3. For views from federal appellate judges themselves in the United States, see 
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of 
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1348–50 
(2018) (“[M]ost of the judges we interviewed do not favor the Chevron rule [judicial 
deference to agency statutory interpretation when certain conditions are met]. Here is 
where we see a ‘D.C. Circuit effect’ in our study. All but one of the D.C. Circuit judges 
we interviewed—who were of different generations and political parties—were admirers 
of Chevron deference, whereas most other judges from the other courts of appeals were 
decidedly anti-Chevron.”). 
4. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Jan S. Oster, The Scope of Judicial 
Review in the German and U.S. Administrative Legal System, 9 GER. L.J. 1267, 1269–75 
(2008); Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eigenständigkeit der Verwaltung [Autonomy of the 
Administration], in 1 GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS [FOUNDATIONS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 677, 727–28 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eberhard Schmidt-
Aßmann & Andreas Vossßkuhle eds., 2nd ed. 2012). Regarding the United States, see, 
for example, John C. Reitz, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review, 66 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 269, 272 (2018). 
5. Regarding Germany, see, for example, JAN OSTER, NORMATIVE 
ERMÄCHTIGUNGEN IM REGULIERUNGSRECHT [NORMATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS IN 
REGULATION] 60–68 (2010). 
6. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Matthias Jestaedt, Maßstäbe des 
Verwaltungshandels [Standards in Administrative Action], in ALLGEMEINES 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT [GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 325, 334–41 (Dirk Ehlers & 
Hermann Pünder eds., 15th ed. 2016); Guy Beaucamp, Ermessens und 
Beurteilungsfehler im Vergleich [Errors of Assessment and Judgment from a 
Comparative Perspective], 2012 JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLÄTTER [LEGAL WORKSHEETS] 
193, 194. For an assessment of this view, see OSTER, supra note 5, at 60–68. Regarding 
Switzerland, see, for example, BENJAMIN SCHINDLER, VERWALTUNGSERMESSEN 
[ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION] 328–29, 339, 383, 407–08 (2010); THIERRY TANQUEREL, 
MANUEL DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK] 177–79 (2d ed. 
2018). 
7. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Jestaedt, supra note 6, at 335–37; 
Beaucamp, supra note 6, at 195. Regarding Switzerland, see, for example, SCHINDLER, 
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This Article is devoted to judicial deference on questions of legal 
interpretation, which must be answered by applying relevant 
principles to the interpretation of the law. A distinction has been made 
between law-based deference—founded on the statutory delegation, to 
administrative bodies, of powers to promulgate rules and regulations 
with the force of law and to adjudicate disputes in specific areas with 
the force of law—and fact-based deference—grounded in the courts’ 
appreciation of the expertise and experience of the administrative 
body.8 In many cases, however, both reasons for judicial deference tend 
to blend and may actually operate together.9  This Article actually 
combines them without blurring the line between them. It is predicated 
on the idea that a legislature may explicitly or implicitly enable or even 
require courts to exercise deference with respect to the administrative 
interpretation of statutes, notably because of the relevant 
administrative bodies’ expertise and experience. Therefore, this Article 
links a normative dimension of deference—the allocation of 
interpretive authority—to a factual one—the asymmetry of non-legal 
expertise between agencies or other administrative bodies and courts. 
Specifically, this Article deals with judicial deference in cases 
involving the interpretation of statutes. The issue is quite 
straightforward when such a limit to the judges’ power is expressly 
foreseen by the constitution or the applicable laws, bearing in mind 
that the constitutionality of a law may still be challenged. However, 
such deference, if and when it arises, is usually not based on a specific 
constitutional provision or statute. Rather, it results from broader 
considerations related to inter-branch relations. 
This Article focuses on the relationship between administrative 
bodies and courts when the interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear 
statute is disputed as opposed to when administrative policy 
determinations are challenged, except when these raise issues relating 
to the interpretation of statutes.10 Judicial deference to administrative 
interpretation of statutes is possible not only in Canada and in the 
United States, but also in other countries.11 Questions relating to the 
 
supra note 6, at 407–09; TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 178–79; Le contrôle de 
l’opportunité [Control of Opportunity], in LE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 
[ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE] 209, 219–23 (François Bellanger & Thierry Tanquerel eds., 
2013). 
8. Regarding the United States, see Reitz, supra note 4, at 272. 
9. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Martin Eifert, 
Letztentscheidungsbefugnisse der Verwaltung: Ermessen, Beurteilungsspielräume sowie 
Planungsentscheidungen und ihre gerichtliche Kontrolle [Ultimate Decision-Making 
Powers of the Administration: Discretion, Latitudes of Judgement, Planning Decisions, 
and their Judicial Control], 2008 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM [J. FOR 
LEGAL STUD.] 336, 339–40. 
10. On this distinction, see infra Parts II, III.A. 
11. Regarding Germany and Switzerland, for instance, see infra Parts III.A, 
VI.C.2. 
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relationship between administrative bodies and courts in statutory 
interpretation cases arise in several democratic countries, regardless 
of their legal traditions.12 They invite us to reflect from a comparative 
perspective, without ignoring the constitutional, legal, and judicial 
context prevailing in each country, and being fully aware that 
generalizations regarding judicial deference should be, if not 
completely avoided, at least very carefully crafted. A nuanced approach 
is actually inevitable. 
This Article, which includes seven parts, presents a few thoughts 
on judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes, 
based on a comparative review. Following the introduction (Part I), 
Part II justifies the choice of the countries considered and explains the 
purpose of this comparative study. Part III sets out relevant 
preconditions for deference in cases involving the interpretation of 
statutes. Parts IV and V respectively make the case for and against 
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. Based 
on this, Part VI evaluates possible limits and criteria for such 
deference. In the Article’s conclusion (Part VII), deference is described 
as oil in the complex machinery of checks and balances. 
II. COUNTRIES CONSIDERED AND PURPOSE OF THE COMPARISON 
Twenty-seven countries and a special administrative region have 
been considered in this Article.13 In addition, the European Union and 
the Council of Europe have also been included, as the case law, 
respectively, of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights is relevant in this field. This 
comparative study is the broadest one among academic articles14 on 
the specific issue of judicial deference to administrative interpretation 
of statutes.15 Although books have been published in this field, some 
 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China), India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea (the Republic of Korea), Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Republic of China), the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. China is also briefly mentioned in this Article. 
14. See generally Paul Craig, Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative 
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 389 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. 
Lindseth, & Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017) (examining aspects of legal systems of 
Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States); Paul Daly, 
Deference on Questions of Law, 74 MOD. L. REV. 694 (2011) [hereinafter Daly, Deference 
on Questions of Law] (examining aspects of the legal systems of Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States); Oster, supra note 4 (examining aspects of the legal 
systems of Germany and the United States). 
15. Unclear issues have been verified by specialists of the relevant countries, who 
are acknowledged in the first footnote. 
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are limited in geographical scope, while others have a broader focus 
and do not look specifically at legal interpretation.16 
While the choice of countries is also based on the availability of 
data, it should primarily allow for coverage of most of the countries 
where adherence to the rule of law may be qualified as strong.17 Since 
the topic of this Article relates to legal interpretation and to the 
relationship among the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, 
it is rooted in the rule of law and judicial independence. When the rule 
of law and judicial independence are not sufficiently guaranteed, it is 
difficult to conduct a principled analysis of judicial deference to 
administrative interpretation of statutes. The choice of countries also 
allows for diversity in terms of legal systems and geography in order to 
avoid either a European- or a North American-centric view. 
This Article firstly aims to identify preconditions for deference in 
cases involving interpretation of statutes. The comparative perspective 
is useful, as it helps to assess whether the issue of judicial deference to 
administrative interpretation of statutes is closely linked to a 
particular system. As this Article will demonstrate, the relevant 
preconditions are quite general and may be met in many countries, 
 
16. See generally DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019) (most of the chapters in this book 
do not, however, focus on judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes); 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
(Jurgen de Poorter, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, & Saskia Lavrijssen eds., 2019) (examining 
aspects of legal systems of the European Union, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom); MATTHEW LEWANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE (2018) 
(examining aspects of the legal systems of Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States); EDUARDO JORDÃO, LE JUGE ET 
L’ADMINISTRATION: ENTRE LE CONTRÔLE ET LA DÉFÉRENCE [THE JUDGE AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION: BETWEEN CONTROL AND DEFERENCE] (2016) (examining aspects of the 
legal systems of Canada, France, Italy and the United States); PAUL DALY, A THEORY OF 
DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIS, APPLICATION AND SCOPE (2012) (examining 
aspects of the legal systems of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States); Oster, supra note 4 (examining aspects of the legal systems of Germany 
and the United States). 
17. The Article covers 18 of the first 20 countries listed in the ranking “Rule of 
Law Around the World” published by the World Justice Project. For the 2020 Index, see 
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020 5 (2020), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-
Online_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KB8-5NJ7] (archived Sept. 26, 2020) (presenting itself 
as “the world’s most comprehensive dataset of its kind and the only to rely principally 
on primary data”). Norway and Estonia were not purposely left out in this Article, but 
reliable data regarding the topic of this Article could not be found for them. European 
countries are already well represented in our analysis. Approximately two thirds of the 
countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and all of the major jurisdictions among them are covered in this Article. The 
OECD is deemed to “form a community of nations committed to the values of democracy 
based on rule of law and human rights”. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD 50TH ANNIVERSARY VISION STATEMENT 2 
(2011), https://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWQ9-JXD3] 
(archived Sept. 26, 2020). 
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which means that this question can arise—and does actually arise—in 
different legal systems. 
Since judicial deference to administrative interpretation of 
statutes depends on rather loose preconditions, this Article secondly 
analyzes the arguments made in favor of or against such deference in 
several countries. Here also, the comparative perspective is interesting 
and even fascinating as similar arguments exist in most, if not all, of 
the countries examined, but are weighed differently. 18  These 
similarities may lead to a nuanced approach with respect to judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. 
This Article tries to use the collected data to define, from a 
comparative perspective, limits and criteria for judicial deference to 
administrative interpretation of statutes. Depending on the country, 
the room for deference may be broader, narrower, or nonexistent. 
Common ground between different countries may be brought to light 
through a comparative study and may indicate where the case for 
judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation is 
strongest. Judges in some countries may find comparative support for 
the doctrine they have developed, but, at the same time, may take into 
consideration arguments to limit the doctrine. Judges in other 
countries may see reasons to reconsider their position against any 
judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases. 
Given the significant cross-national variation in administrative 
law systems, this Article is framed with an awareness of national 
differences but is not hindered by this. Many important factors that 
might come into play have been considered in order to come up with a 
way of thinking about deference which could intelligibly apply to 
different countries. Nevertheless, various features in administrative 
law systems may significantly affect debates about deference. The 
difference between review in specialized administrative courts or 
tribunals versus general jurisdiction courts may influence approaches 
to deference.19 The possibilities for a court to appoint experts may also 
play a role in this respect. This Article takes these issues into account, 
as it puts at its center the asymmetry of non-legal expertise between 
administrative bodies and courts.20 Depending on many factors, this 
asymmetry may be minimal or important. The processes by which 
 
18. For a comparative perspective, see, for example, Guobin Zhu, Deference to the 
Administration in Judicial Review: Comparative Perspectives, in DEFERENCE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 1, 10–11. 
19. But see Despoina Mantzari, Judicial Scrutiny of Regulatory Decisions at the 
UK’s Specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 16, 63, 80 (“Even specialist 
tribunals are limited in their ability to decide on regulatory remedies, which involve the 
representation of diverse interests, the balancing of a variety of goals, and prospective 
analysis.”). 
20. See infra Parts IV.A.1, VI.B. 
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statutes are drafted and the way—precise or vague, for instance—in 
which they are written, may also affect the salience of the issue. The 
breadth of delegation to agencies or other administrative bodies of 
powers to adjudicate disputes in specific areas with the force of law 
may considerably vary from one country to another. 
Furthermore, this Article insists on the margin of interpretation 
that a statute must allow in order for the issue of deference to 
potentially appear.21 It also emphasizes the role of the legislature,22 
which may vary from one country to another or from one piece of 
legislation to another in the same country. In other words, this Article 
is based on a nuanced approach and gives attention to how systemic or 
structural differences between countries or within a given country 
might bear on deference issues. Finally, without any claim to 
completeness, the way proceedings and deliberations are conducted by 
agencies or other administrative bodies—court-like or more 
government-like, for instance—as well as the parties’ degree of 
involvement and procedural rights in those proceedings—with 
disparities or similarities between countries23—may impact the debate 
on judicial deference. The importance of procedural safeguards, with 
respect to the issues covered, is given prominence in this Article.24 
III. PRECONDITIONS FOR DEFERENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
Judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes 
may arise where three main preconditions are met. Firstly, the statute 
in question allows a margin of interpretation with respect to the 
specific issue raised (subpart A). Secondly, the court’s deference must 
fit within international, constitutional, as well as statutory or other 
constraints (subpart B) and, thirdly, the court’s deference must 




21. See infra Parts III.A, VI.C.2. 
22. See infra Parts III.C, VI.C. 
23. Regarding the United States and Germany, see Hermann Pünder, German 
Administrative Procedure in a Comparative Perspective: Observations on the Path to a 
Transnational Ius Commune Proceduralis in Administrative Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
940, 950 (2013) (“[L]ooking at ‘formal adjudications,’ . . . [t]he procedural requirements 
in the two jurisdictions are quite alike. The conflict between the demand for democratic 
decision-making under the rule of law and administrative efficiency is resolved in a 
similar way in both countries.”). 
24. See infra Parts III.B, V.D, VI.A. 
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A. Interpretation of Statutes and Margin of Interpretation 
In the context of this Article, the interpretation of statutes refers, 
broadly speaking, to the process of determining the meaning of 
statutory provisions. An agency or another administrative body that 
administers a statute, and the court that reviews the decisions based 
on the statute, must carry out this process. This issue becomes 
especially interesting when the relevant statutory provision is 
ambiguous or unclear. This Article does not deal primarily with judicial 
control over administrative decisions when a statute, in itself clear, 
allows an administrative body to choose among several possibilities 
and grants it a margin of discretion or appreciation in this regard.25 In 
such a case, questions relating to the interpretation of the statute may 
arise, but they are typically not at the core of the litigation in judicial 
proceedings, which will focus in many countries, for instance, on the 
principle of proportionality.26 This Article covers this issue when the 
provision granting administrative discretion, for example regarding 
the possibility to choose between several measures, is itself ambiguous. 
In such a case, the statute’s interpretation becomes crucial when the 
administrative body and then the court determine the scope of 
discretion that the first enjoys and that the second must respect. 
The debate on judicial deference to administrative interpretation 
of statutes essentially arises where an unclear or ambiguous statute 
must initially be interpreted by an administrative body and then by a 
court. In the United States, the statute must be “silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue,” according to the landmark Chevron 
decision of the Supreme Court. 27  In Canada, the Supreme Court 
follows a similar approach, at least in some cases: 
because legislatures do not always speak clearly and because the tools of 
statutory interpretation do not always guarantee a single clear answer, 
legislative provisions will on occasion be susceptible to multiple reasonable 
interpretations. . . . [T]he resolution of unclear language in an administrative 
 
25. On the distinction between margin of appreciation and margin of discretion, 
see Rob Widdershoven, The European Court of Justice and the Standard of Judicial 
Review, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE, supra note 16, at 39, 53 (noting that, “in the case law of the [European Court of 
Justice,] such distinction is generally not made and both terms are used 
interchangeably”). 
26. On proportionality as a “master concept of public law,” even though there is 
no explicit “proportionality review” in American administrative law, see Jud Mathews, 
Proportionality Review in Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
supra note 14, at 405–06. Regarding the United States specifically, see generally Jud 
Mathews, Agency Discretion, Judicial Review and ‘Proportionality’ in US Administrative 
Law, in THE JUDGE AND THE PROPORTIONATE USE OF DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STUDY 160 (Sofia Ranchordás & Boudewijn de Waard eds., 2015). 
27. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
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decision maker’s home statute is usually best left to the decision maker. That is 
so because the choice between multiple reasonable interpretations will often 
involve policy considerations that we presume the legislature desired the 
administrative decision maker—not the courts—to make. Indeed, the exercise of 
that interpretative discretion is part of an administrative decision maker’s 
“expertise.” . . . It will not always be the case that a particular provision permits 
multiple reasonable interpretations. Where the ordinary tools of statutory 
interpretation lead to a single reasonable interpretation and the administrative 
decision maker adopts a different interpretation, its interpretation will 
necessarily be unreasonable—no degree of deference can justify its 
acceptance. . . . In those cases, the “range of reasonable outcomes” . . . will 
necessarily be limited to a single reasonable interpretation—and the 
administrative decision maker must adopt it.28 
In Germany or Switzerland, for instance, the statute must contain 
an “indefinite legal term,”29  though this is only a precondition for 
eventual judicial deference. 30  In Austria, the federal Constitution 
provides that  
[e]xcept in administrative penal proceedings and in legal matters pertaining to 
the competence of the Administrative Court of the Federation for Finance, 
illegality does not exist to the extent the law permits the administrative 
authority to apply discretion and the authority has done so in the sense of the 
law.31  
It is now considered that this provision does not prevent the 
adoption of federal statutes that grant the administration or specific 
agencies some discretion—to be subsequently respected by 
administrative courts—in the interpretation of indefinite legal terms 
in complex technical or economic matters.32 One should finally note 
that said courts can decide cases on the merits. 
 
28. McLean v. Exec. Dir. of the British Columbia Sec. Comm’n, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 
895, paras. 32–33, 38 (Can.) (citations omitted). For a critical view on this approach, see 
Paul Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, 66 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2D) 233, 248–50 
(2014) [hereinafter Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law]. 
29. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1271–73; 
Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744–46. Regarding Switzerland, see, for example, 
PIERRE MOOR, ALEXANDRE FLÜCKIGER & VINCENT MARTENET, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 749–54 (3d ed. 2012). 
30. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Manfred Aschke, § 40, in BECK’SCHER 
ONLINE-KOMMENTAR VWVFG [BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT] ¶¶ 102–03 (Johann Bader & Michael Ronellenfitsch eds., 50th ed. 
2021); ROLF WANK, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN [THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS] 52–
53 (6th ed. 2015); Eifert, supra note 9, at 339. 
31. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, 
art. 130, ¶ 3, (Austria) (reinstated in 1945, with subsequent amendments) 
translated in https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Austria_2013.pdf?lang=en) 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FVK5-4G6L] (archived Sept. 25, 2020). 
32. See, e.g., Michael Mayrhofer, Administrative Spielräume und die Rolle der 
Heilmittel- Evaluierungs-Kommission bei der Aufnahme eines Arzneimittels in den 
Erstattungskodex [Administrative Scope and Role of the Pharmaceutical Evaluation 
Commission in Including a Drug in the Reimbursement Code], 2016 JOURNAL FÜR 
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In the Czech Republic, ambiguous statutory terms might have led 
to some deference from courts in the past, but the tendency goes 
towards full judicial review of the interpretation of such terms.33 In 
Denmark, courts normally do not defer to the administrative 
interpretation of a statute, but they may sometimes be more reluctant 
to conduct an in-depth review of the interpretation chosen by an agency 
when a provision of statute is formulated very broadly.34 In Japan, 
courts often admit that administrative bodies may hold a primary 
decision-making power and that courts may only review the 
reasonableness of these decisions. 35  It is, however, neither 
theoretically nor empirically established whether the interpretation of 
statutes by administrative bodies is also embodied in this attitude. 
Indeed, agency discretion may arise from indefinite concepts,36 but 
judicial deference relates especially to fact-finding, the application of a 
statutory concept in a specific factual context, or some procedural 
decisions, 37  but not so much to the interpretation of a statute. 
Japanese courts have never officially adopted a Chevron-type 
deference. In Poland, some administrative discretion may result from 
the interpretation of vague statutory terms,38 but a doctrine of judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes has not yet been 
developed by Polish courts.39 
In sum, the provision(s) of a statute at issue can reasonably be 
interpreted in various ways.40 Of course, the difference between clarity 
and ambiguity is equivocal and is itself a question of interpretation.41 
 
MEDIZIN UND GESUNDHEITSRECHT [J. MED. & HEALTH L.] 54, 57 (Austria); Stefan Storr, 
Prüfungsmaßstab der Verwaltungsgerichte [Administrative Tribunals’ Standards of 
Review],  2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERKHERSRECHT [J. TRAFFIC L.] 248, 441 (Ger.). 
33. See Nejvyšší správní soud České republiky 22.4.2014 (NSS) [Decision of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Apr. 22, 2014], čj. 8 Azs 37/2011-154, ¶ 24 (Czech). See 
also Zdenek Kühn & Josef Staša, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in 
the Czech Republic, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra 
note 16, at 133, 139–40. 
34. See Bent Ole, Gram Mortensen & Frederik Waage, Deference to the 
Administration in Judicial Review in Denmark, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION 
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 157, 161. 
35. See Norikazu Kawagishi, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review 
in Japan, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 
295, 299–305. 
36. See id. at 301–02. 
37. See id. at 304–05. 
38. See Zbigniew Kmieciak & Joanna Wegner, Deference to the Public 
Administration in Judicial Review: A Polish Perspective, in DEFERENCE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 363, 375–76. 
39. See id. at 373–77. 
40. On this issue, see, for example. Jeffrey Barnes, Statutory Interpretation and 
Administrative Law, in MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AUSTRALIA: CONCEPTS AND 
CONTEXT 119, 133–39 (Matthew Groves ed., 2014). 
41. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISM OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN WRIT SMALL 150 (2007). 
2021] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 95 
 
The presence of ambiguity, vagueness, or broadness may lead to at 
least two admissible or defensible interpretations of a statute in light 
of the applicable methods and canons of construction used by courts 
and, as the case may be, administrative bodies.42 In brief, the statute 
allows a margin of interpretation or construction.43 
It is, however, argued that “[a]mbiguity should not be allowed to 
become the gateway to deference” and that “[t]he proper gateway is the 
delegation of interpretive authority.”44 Are these two approaches really 
in opposition? The principles of statutory interpretation may indeed 
assist “in determining the extent of the authority delegated [or, better, 
granted] to the administrative decision-maker.” 45  Typically, in 
countries where judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases is 
accepted, statutes often do not explicitly grant agencies or other 
administrative bodies an interpretive authority.46 The grant—if any—
of some or all of this authority may inter alia result from the ambiguity, 
unclearness, vagueness, broadness, or indefiniteness of legal terms. 
Consequently, the “modest role for the principles of statutory 
interpretation in identifying rather than circumscribing 
administrative autonomy” 47  determines whether a statute is 
ambiguous, unclear or vague, or contains an indefinite legal term. This 
does not mean that the principles of statutory interpretation are 
“designed to identify ambiguity”; they are indeed “designed to resolve 
it.”48 But the best answer to a legal question and to the allocation of 
interpretive authority may sometimes have to go through a 
preliminary assessment of ambiguity, unclearness, vagueness, or 
indefiniteness. 
 
42. On this issue, see, for example, Daly, Deference on Questions of Law, supra 
note 14, at 699–700. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Eifert, supra note 9, at 338–
39. 
43. A distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” is not made here in 
this context, but scholars in the United States recently based their reflections on this 
distinction. The first concept is supposed to call “for discerning the meaning of a statute,” 
and the second one “for determining the legal effect of the statute, through 
implementation rules, specification, and other devices.” See generally Lawrence B. Solum 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2020). 
In this Article, “interpretation” is used in a broad sense that encompasses the 
“construction” of open-textured words such as “harm.” On the notion of “constructional 
choice,” regarding Australia, see Janina Boughey, The Case for “Deference” to (Some) 
Executive Interpretations of Law, in INTERPRETING EXECUTIVE POWER 34, 36, 53 (Janina 
Boughey & Lisa Burton Crawford eds., 2020). 
44. Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra note 28, at 268. 
45. Id. at 267. 
46. On this issue, see id. at 267 (“A reviewing court’s approach must be holistic: 
it should not focus on one clause or one statutory provision in isolation, but must strive 
to understand the regulatory framework created by the whole of the statute.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
47. Id. at 269–70. 
48. Id. at 254. 
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The point that deference should not become the gateway to further 
deference is nevertheless taken, as courts should not assess ambiguity 
or unclearness in itself, but the existence of a margin of interpretation 
in light of the applicable methods and canons of construction. This 
approach is more flexible and gradual49 than the one—too schematic 
and binary—that consists of determining whether or not a statute is 
ambiguous.50 Judges are not supposed to either unnecessarily define 
the exact extent of the margin, or list all the admissible or reasonable 
interpretations of the statute provision at hand.51 Moreover, by finding 
the existence of a margin of interpretation, they do not have to indicate 
their preference for a different interpretation of the statute than the 
one chosen by the administrative body; they simply accept the latter 
because it remains within said margin.52 
B. International, Constitutional, Statutory, and Other Constraints 
Deference presents itself within a constitutional and statutory 
framework. Ceteris paribus, the more constraining the latter, the less 
relevant the debate on judicial deference in statutory interpretation 
cases becomes. International constraints may also come into play, most 
notably regarding the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),53 Article 8 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, or Article 7 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.54 General principles such as 
the rule of law may impose other constraints. 
 
49. On this question, focusing on Canada, see RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN ON THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 25 (6th ed. 2014) (“Texts are not either plain or ambiguous; 
rather they are more or less plain and more or less ambiguous. The factors that justify 
outcomes in statutory interpretation are multiple, involving inferences about meaning 
and intention derived from the text, non-textual evidence of legislative intent, 
specialized knowledge, ‘common sense’ and legal norms. These factors interact in 
complex ways.”). Regarding the United States, see Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1446 (2017). 
50. On this issue, see, for example, JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 233–35, 248–49. 
51. Regarding Canada, see a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.C. 65, para. 83 (“[A] 
court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have 
made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the 
‘range’ of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct 
a de novo analysis or seek to determine the ‘correct’ solution to the problem.”). 
52. On this issue, see VERMEULE, supra note 41, at 156–65. Regarding the United 
States, see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 
S. Ct. 2367, 2400 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If I had to, I would of 
course decide which is the marginally better reading [of the statute]. But Chevron 
deference was built for cases like these.”). 
53. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5. 
54. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 26363. 
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Two types of constitutional constraints limit the possibility of 
judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases. Firstly, the role of 
the judiciary is defined in general terms in many constitutions. The 
relevant constitutional provisions may prevent any general or broad 
deference from the courts reviewing administrative decisions. 55 
Secondly, constitutional procedural safeguards may guarantee the 
right to appeal these decisions to a court which can fully review the 
merits of each case by assessing all relevant facts in addition to the 
correct interpretation of the law and its application to the facts.56 In 
the United States, deference doctrines—Chevron in particular—are 
under fire by various scholars, and deference claims are met with 
increased skepticism in courts; notably, the argument is made that due 
process rights come into play and restrict a court’s ability to defer to 
agency interpretation of statutes.57 
Statutory constraints can typically require courts to fully assess 
the merits of a case and prevent them from using any type of deference 
to administrative interpretation of statutes.58 In the United States, a 
2018 bill adopted in the state of Arizona forbids all judicial deference 
in constitutional interpretation or interpretation of statutes regarding 
most of the state’s own agencies: 
[i]n a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court shall decide 
all questions of law, including the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory 
provision or a rule adopted by an agency, without deference to any previous 
determination that may have been made on the question by the agency.59 
C. The Legislature’s Intent or Assent 
Judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes 
seems to relate to the relationship between the judiciary and the 
executive branches. However, the legislature is also a key player 
 
55. See infra Parts V.C, VI.A. 
56. See infra Parts V.D, VI.A. 
57. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 
(2016). But see Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 4 (2020) (“[F]or all of its alarmism about bureaucrats running amok and 
assertions that the contemporary administrative state violates the constitutional order, 
the Roberts Court hadn’t yet pulled back significantly on administrative governance in 
practice.”). 
58. Regarding the United States, see, for example, The Chevron Doctrine: 
Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (2016) (statement of Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor 
of Public Interest Law, George Washington University) [hereinafter Statement of 
Jonathan Turley] (“Because the [Chevron] doctrine is based on assumption of delegated 
authority, Congress can aggressively move to limit such deference. . ..”). 
59. H.B. 2238, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 12-910(E) (Ariz. 2018).  
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here.60 It may widely forbid any judicial deference, as the state of 
Arizona recently did, or, on the contrary, expressly authorize it. 
Express authorization is seldom granted and must in any case 
comply with applicable international, constitutional, statutory and 
other constraints. The second sentence of Section 71(5) of the German 
Act against Restraints of Competition is an interesting example in this 
regard, as it states that “[t]he evaluation of the general economic 
situation and trends by the competition authority shall not be subject 
to review by the court.”61 
In the vast majority of cases, statutes do not explicitly address the 
issue of judicial deference but do not expressly preclude it either.62 
Scholars and courts 63  in some countries have developed various 
theories according to which the legislature is supposed to have 
accepted judicial deference and this particular setting of the separation 
of powers principle or of the concept of checks and balances. 
In the United States, the Chevron doctrine especially supposes 
that Congress has delegated or granted agencies the authority to act 
with the force of law. 64  In Germany, it is based on the so-called 
“normative authorization doctrine” (normative Ermächtigungslehre).65 
 
60. From a comparative perspective, see Peter Lindseth, Judicial Review in 
Administrative Governance: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis, in 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, supra note 16, at 175, 188. See also, 
with a special focus on Canada, DALY, supra note 16, at 36–69 (concluding, on page 69, 
that “a holistic approach, which requires a proper consideration of the relevant statutory 
provisions, is necessary to ascertain the extent of the delegation of power”). Regarding 
Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1273-75; Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, 
Artikel 19 Abs. 4 [Article 19 Sect. 4], in GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR [BASIC LAW: 
COMMENTARY] ¶¶ 184–86 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds, 2020). Regarding the 
United States, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 
1634–35 (2019) (“The initial question, and perhaps the only question, is: What has 
Congress required?”). 
61. Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints 
of Competition], June 26, 2013, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] § 71(5) (Ger.), translated 
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/QJW2-8R7T] (archived Sept. 20, 2020); see also 
Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] [German Telecommunications Act], July 25, 1996,  
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] § 10(2) (Ger.), translated in 
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=692 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/99JX-LR4H] (archived Sept. 23, 2020). 
62. Regarding Germany and the U.S., see Oster, supra note 4, at 1284; KLAAS 
BOSCH, DIE KONTROLLDICHTE DER GERICHTLICHEN ÜBERPRÜFUNG VON 
MARKTREGULIERUNGSENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER BUNDESNETZAGENTUR NACH DEM 
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ [THE DENSITY OF CONTROL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
MARKET REGULATION DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL NETWORK AGENCY ACCORDING TO THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT] 46–50 (2010); Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 746. 
63. From a comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 18, at 7 (“Deference is a 
legal concept developed by judge made law.” (emphasis in original)). 
64. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
65. See, e.g., Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 103; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 736, 
743–44; Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 60, ¶¶ 185–87a; Andreas Voßkuhle, 
Entscheidungsspielräume der Verwaltung (Ermessen, Beurteilungsspielraum, 
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These American and German approaches are comparable, though they 
differ conceptually, and their doctrinal importance is not the same—
central in the United States, at least theoretically, more peripheral in 
Germany.66 In Switzerland, a similar approach to the one existing in 
Germany can be observed in several Federal Tribunal cases.67 In the 
Netherlands, the law may grant a margin of discretion in statutory 
interpretation to an agency.68 In each case, courts must assess whether 
the legislature aimed at granting discretionary powers to an 
independent authority, for example to the Dutch Authority for 
Consumers and Markets.69 The particular expertise of the authority 
will be an important justification for such a legislative choice.70 Two 
comments must, however, be made regarding the Netherlands. On the 
one hand, the principle of effective judicial protection tends, ceteris 
 
planerische Gestaltungsfreiheit) [Scopes for Decision-Making of the Administration 
Discretion, Latitude of Judgment, Freedom of Planning], 2008 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 
[LEGAL TRAINING] 117, 118. For an extensive and comparative study (Germany-U.S.) of 
this issue, see Oster, supra note 4. 
66. See Oster, supra note 4, at 1295 (“Both doctrines are based on the assumption 
that it is the legislature who decides whether courts have to grant deference. However, 
the normative authorization theory has a further prerequisite compared to the Chevron 
doctrine. According to Chevron, the authorization of the agency lies in the ambiguity of 
the statute. German courts require an indefinite legal term and in addition an explicit 
or implicit legislative authorization to interpret the term . . .. The difference between the 
second requirement of the German normative authorization doctrine and the U.S. 
Chevron doctrine is marginal, because many of the requirements of the German ‘step 
two’ are already included in the rationales of Chevron, e.g. the agency expertise or the 
procedure.”). 
67. The Federal Tribunal is Switzerland’s highest court, the Bundesgericht, the 
Tribunal fédéral or the Tribunale federale. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] Mar. 21, 2014, 140 
ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL [ATF] I 201, 205–06 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer] 
[Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 7, 2009, 135 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 384, 389–90 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer] Apr. 21, 2006, 
132 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 257, 262–63. 
On this case law, see TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 218–19, 222–23, who approves of the 
Federal Tribunal’s approach. 
68. See Saskia Lavrijssen & Maartje de Visser, Independent Administrative 
Authorities and the Standard of Judicial Review, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 111, 114 (2006). 
69. See Saskia Lavrijssen & Fatma Çapkurt, Who Guards the Guardians? 
Judicial Oversight of the Authority Consumer and Market’s Energy Regulations in the 
Netherlands, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, supra note 16, at 
133, 140–41. 
70. See Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, Deference to the 
Administration in Judicial Review: The Case of the Netherlands, in DEFERENCE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 327, 339–41; Arnout P. Klap, 
Rechterlijke toetsing aan vage normen in Nederland en Duitsland [Judicial Review of 
Vague Norms in the Netherlands and Germany], in TOETSING AAN VAGE NORMEN IN HET 
NEDERLANDSE, DUITSE, ENGELSE EN FRANSE RECHT [REVIEW OF VAGUE NORMS IN 
DUTCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW] 1, 1 (Arnout P. Klap, F. Taco Groenewegen 
& Jean Reiner van Angeren eds., 2014) (drawing a distinction between vague norms that 
entail a weighing of interests, those that demand an evaluation of future events, those 
that require specific expertise and those with a supranational character, as well as 
combinations thereof). 
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paribus, to strengthen the intensity of judicial review.71 On the other 
hand, and by contrast to a certain extent, courts sometimes defer to the 
interpretation of vague legal notions by independent specialized 
authorities even when courts are entitled and supposed to carry out a 
full review of the law.72 
In Canada, a recent landmark decision of the Supreme Court73 
rightfully puts the focus on the legislature’s intent with respect to the 
applicable standard of review, which then has implications on the 
question of judicial deference to administrative interpretation of 
statutes. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the Court correctly 
presumed74 or assessed the intent,75 and especially whether the intent 
was not too generally and schematically determined. 76  Has the 
Supreme Court itself applied the “modern principle” of statutory 
interpretation to which it is referring,77 while implicitly interpreting 
all the relevant and affected statutes? In any event, this decision does 
 
71. See Lavrijssen & Çapkurt, supra note 69, at 154–68; Barkhuysen & van 
Emmerik, supra note 70, at 336–41. 
72. See Lavrijssen & Çapkurt, supra note 69, at 145–48, 159–60 and the 
examples mentioned within. 
73. See generally Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 
2019 S.C.C. 65. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled, on the basis of its interpretation 
of the Canadian Citizenship Act, that a person born in Canada to parents who were 
undercover Russian spies is a Canadian citizen. 
74. Id. para. 23 (“Where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision 
(i.e., judicial review of an administrative decisions [sic] other than a review related to a 
breach of natural justice and/or the duty of procedural fairness), the standard of review 
it applies must reflect the legislature’s intent with respect to the role of the reviewing 
court, except where giving effect to that intent is precluded by the rule of law. The 
starting point for the analysis is a presumption that the legislature intended the 
standard of review to be reasonableness.”). 
75. Id. para. 17 (“The presumption of reasonableness review can be rebutted in 
two types of situations. The first is where the legislature has indicated that it intends a 
different standard or set of standards to apply. This will be the case where the legislature 
explicitly prescribes the applicable standard of review. It will also be the case where the 
legislature has provided a statutory appeal mechanism from an administrative decision 
to a court, thereby signaling the legislature’s intent that appellate standards apply when 
a court reviews the decision. The second situation in which the presumption of 
reasonableness review will be rebutted is where the rule of law requires that the 
standard of correctness be applied.”). 
76. Id. para. 246 (Abella & Karakatsanis, JJ., concurring) (“In reality, the 
majority’s position on statutory appeal rights, although couched in language about 
‘giv[ing] effect to the legislature’s institutional design choices’, hinges almost entirely on 
a textualist argument: the presence of the word ‘appeal’ indicates a legislative intent 
that courts apply the same standards of review found in civil appellate jurisprudence.”). 
77. Id. paras. 117–18. On the “modern principle,” see, however, Stéphane Beaulac 
& Pierre-André Côté, Driedger’s “Modern Principle” at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization, 40 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS [THÉMIS L. 
REV.] 131, 171 (2006) (“The construction of statutes constitutes such a complex process, 
especially in the harder cases that tend to end up in courts, that it is extremely difficult 
to state the proper approach to interpretation in but a few words, if it can be done at 
all.”). 
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not close the discussion, as it will be followed by other judicial decisions 
and may give rise to a reaction by the legislature. If it is not satisfied 
by the approach followed by the Supreme Court, the legislature can ex 
post and pro futuro change current statutory provisions within the 
constraints of the rule of law and enact new statutes taking this case 
law into consideration. Thus, the legislature retains a form of control 
on this issue, with the caveat that each statutory provision is then 
interpreted by administrative bodies and courts—a process the 
legislature does not control. 
In brief, the legislature must assent to judicial deference or, in 
other words, enable courts to defer to administrative statutory 
interpretation—passively and ex post78 at the very least. This principle 
seems to be common to several countries, although its 
conceptualization differs from one to the next. In short, the legislature 
has the control over this issue, as it can open or close the door to judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Its intent or 
assent is, however, often at best implicit, which means that courts have 
to determine whether and, if so, to what extent they should or can defer 
to administrative bodies.79 
Finally, in a given country, administrative decision-makers that 
have interpretive authority may even benefit from a “presumption of 
deference,” 80  to the point where one may consider that judicial 
 
78. Regarding the United States, see William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, 
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1188 (2008) (“[A] 
longstanding agency interpretation that regulated parties have internalized and that 
Congress has acquiesced in should rarely be overturned . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
79. From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 
345, 571–72. 
80. Regarding Canada, the majority of the Supreme Court in the recent Vavilov 
decision held that all administrative decisions should presumptively be reviewed on the 
reasonableness standard and, thus, receive judicial deference, unless either legislative 
intent or the rule of law requires otherwise. 2019 S.C.C. 65 paras. 10, 23–72. When 
applicable, this standard also covers questions of statutory interpretation—provided, in 
particular, that they are not “general questions of law of central importance to the legal 
system as a whole,” id. paras. 58–62—and means that administrative decisions are 
allowed to stand as long as they are “reasonable.” In other words, the “presumption of 
reasonableness review” corresponds to a “presumption of deference.” See, e.g., Steven 
Mason, Brandon Kain, Joanna Nairn, Richard Lizius & James S.S. Holtom, The Supreme 
Court of Canada Simplifies the Standard of Review Analysis in Historic Super Bowl 
Trilogy, MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/touchdown-supreme-court-canada-
simplifies-standard-review-analysis-historic-super-bowl-trilogy [https://perma.cc/2HZ6-
EULL] (archived Sept. 24, 2020) (using both concepts interchangeably). The Vavilov 
decision strengthened the presumption but, at the same time, created a large exception 
in the case of statutory appeals. In this respect, two Justices considered, in Vavilov, that 
this decision greatly erodes the presumption of deference, 2019 S.C.C. 65 paras. 199–201 
(Abella & Karakatsanis, JJ., concurring), established in Alberta. See Alberta 
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Ass’n [2011] S.C.R. 654, 
656 para. 34 (“[U]nless the situation is exceptional, the interpretation by the tribunal of 
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“intervention should be the exception rather than the norm.”81 Such an 
approach may, however, be difficult to reconcile with the constitutional 
role of courts and procedural safeguards in many countries.82 In the 
European context, such a presumption is incompatible with Article 6 
of the European Convention of Human Rights when this human right 
is applicable.83 
IV. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
In several countries, various aspects of administrative legitimacy 
and of the principle of separation of powers (subpart A) as well as the 
optimal allocation of limited resources (subpart B) may justify judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes, at least in 
certain cases. Humility, honesty, and transparency from the courts 
(subpart C) as well as other considerations (subpart D) may also 
explain some form of judicial deference. 
A. Administrative Legitimacy and the Separation of Powers 
The legitimacy of agencies and other administrative bodies is 
based on several factors. One of the—if not the—primary bases for 
their legitimacy is their expertise—and that of their officials and staff 
(1). Their political accountability (2) or their independence (3) and the 
political discretion that may be linked to certain areas of public activity 
(4) also deserve specific mention. This list is not exhaustive. 
1. Expertise 
Some government organizations, like agencies, are typically 
specialized in a certain field. Their officials and staff possess specific 
expertise and experience in the relevant field. Experience may lead to 
expertise (the “catch-all” notion in this respect, as it includes 
experience in this context), according to the terminology used in this 
Article. A statute’s interpretation raises legal issues, but also non-legal 
ones of which courts may have limited knowledge.84 In the United 
 
its home statute or statutes closely connected to its function should be presumed to be a 
question of statutory interpretation subject to deference on judicial review.”). On this 
presumption before Vavilov, see Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra 
note 28, at 251. 
81. Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra note 28, at 270. 
82. See infra Parts V.C–D, VI.A. 
83. See infra Part V.D. 
84. From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 
86–124; Michael C. Tolley, Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: 
Deference Doctrines in Comparative Perspective, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 421, 421 (2003) (“The 
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States, the specific expertise of specialized agencies contributes to 
justify both the Chevron deference, doctrine, test, or space,85 which—
when applicable—requires a federal court to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision if this 
interpretation is considered reasonable,86 and the Skidmore deference, 
doctrine, test, or weight, which allows a federal court to determine the 
appropriate level of deference for each case based on “the thoroughness 
evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”87 
A high level of judicial deference may take place when scientific 
knowledge is required, bearing in mind that this does not mean 
absence of review; mutual efforts must be made in order to establish 
rigorous analytical yardsticks to guide the administrative decision 
process and to provide courts with a framework against which to 
review the administrative decisions.88 
In certain countries such as Canada, even administrative 
decisions involving constitutional values may be subject to deference, 
since “[a]n administrative decision-maker exercising a discretionary 
power under her home statute, has, by virtue of expertise and 
specialization, particular familiarity with the competing 
considerations at play in weighing Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] 
 
general idea is that specialist agencies are often in a better position than courts to resolve 
the ambiguities, and interpreting a statute in a way that promotes effective public policy 
may depend more on the expertise of the agency and less on the limited knowledge and 
modes of reasoning employed by courts.”). 
85. See generally Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing – Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012). 
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984); see, e.g., The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in 
Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commerical & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 69 (2016) 
(statement of Emily Hammond, Associate Dean for Public Engagement & Professor of 
Law, Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch.) [hereinafter Statement of Emily Hammond] (“Agencies 
have experience with the statutes they administer and the challenges that arise under 
the applicable regulatory regimes. Relative to the courts, agencies also have superior 
expertise, particularly with respect to complex scientific or technical matters.”). 
87. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see, e.g., The Chevron 
Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 62 (2016) (statement of Richard J. Pierce, Lyle 
T. Alverson Professor of Law, Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch.) (“The [Skidmore] test was based 
on the comparative advantage of specialized agencies over generalist courts because of 
agencies’ greater subject matter expertise and greater experience in implementing a 
statutory regime. The results of applications of the test suggest that it is deferential to 
agency decisions.”). 
88. Regarding the United States, see Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy 
Wagner, Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1703 
(2015); see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and 
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756 (2011). 
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values.”89 However, “constitutional questions” as such “require a final 
and determinate answer from the courts.”90 
In some countries where there is very little or no judicial deference 
to administrative statutory interpretation, it is interesting to note that 
expertise may not be regarded as a primary characteristic of public 
administration. In Australia for instance, “expertise is a special 
characteristic of some administrative decision-makers rather than an 
assumed characteristic of public administration generally,” the upper 
echelons of the public service having been “predominantly populated 
by ‘generalists.’”91 One should be careful before drawing institutional 
conclusions from this observation, which is otherwise debatable. Still, 
the Australian High Court has held that “there is very limited scope 
for the notion of ‘judicial deference’ with respect to findings by an 
administrative body of jurisdictional facts,”92 but interpretation of the 
law is considered as a separate matter. Indeed, the interpretation of 
the law by the judiciary and judicial control over administrative 
interpretation are seen as “fundamental” by the High Court. 93 
Australian case law may actually give some room to various forms of 
judicial deference especially relating to fact-finding and applying the 
law to facts94  due to, for instance, the specific expertise of certain 
administrative bodies,95 but the High Court has declined to adopt the 
 
89. Doré v. Barreau du Québec [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, 397 para. 47 (Can.); see also 
Loyola High School v. Att’y Gen. of Québec [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, paras. 4, 35–42 (Can.). 
On this Canadian case law, see LEWANS, supra note 16, at 180–83; see also Claudia 
Geiringer, Process and Outcome in Judicial Review of Public Authority Compatibility 
with Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 329, 349–57, 359–60 (Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott eds., 2015). 
90. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.C. 
65 para. 55. 
91. Peter Cane, Judicial Control of Administrative Interpretation in Australia 
and the United States, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra 
note 89, at 215, 222; see also Lisa B. Crawford, The Rule of Law in the Age of Statutes, 
48 FED. L. REV. 159, 182 (2020) (“Undoubtedly, there are those within the executive 
branch who have worked at the coalface of the relevant sphere of government activity 
for many years. The legislation that governs that field may have incorporated the 
technical language and concepts that these actors work with every day (but which may 
be incomprehensible to a judge or generalist lawyer). But the now corpulent 
administrative state is surely also staffed, in no small part, by low-grade and transitory 
staff who have no great expertise in the field of government activity in which they are 
involved.”).; Mark Aronson, Should We Have a Variable Error of Law Standard?, in THE 
SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 241, 261. 
92. Corp. of the City of Enfield v Dev. Assessment Comm’n [2000] 199 CLR 135 
para. 59 (Austl.). 
93. Id. paras. 40, 43, 45. 
94. See Stephen Gageler, Deference, 22 AUSTRALIAN J. ADMIN. L. 151, 154–56 
(2015); Alan Freckelton, The Concept of ‘Deference’ in Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions in Australia – Part 1, 73 AUSTRALIAN INST. OF ADMIN. L.F. 52, 62–-67 (2013). 
95. See Fleur Kingham, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in 
Australia, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, 
at 39, 61–62; Freckelton, supra note 94, at 64–66; Barnes, supra note 40, at 133. 
2021] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 105 
 
Chevron doctrine 96  especially because of the Australian courts’ 
constitutional role.97 
The deliberative process that takes place in many agencies or 
other administrative bodies, organized as commissions for instance, is 
also supposed to grant particular legitimacy to the decisions made and 
to the interpretation of statutes on which they are based. However, a 
deliberative process also occurs in courts when decisions are taken by 
a panel of judges, and an individual judge may interact with her clerks. 
Furthermore, legitimacy resulting from the administrative 
deliberative process actually depends on the expertise and experience 
of the people involved.98  Diversity in this respect can broaden and 
enrich the interpretation of the statute. In principle, interdisciplinarity 
with regard to non-legal questions does not exist in courts, at least not 
to the same degree. 
2. Political Accountability 
In some countries, administrative bodies such as agencies may not 
be independent from government or may only be independent to a 
limited extent; as a result, the executive is more clearly held 
accountable for their decisions. Political interference may, therefore, 
exist or, depending on the jurisdiction, become inevitable. However, 
political accountability is seen as a reinforcing factor of administrative 
legitimacy compared to the legitimacy of the courts.99  Accordingly, 
some judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases would be 
justified. The “democratic basis for distributing legal authority to 
administrative officials” 100 and even the separation of powers101 are 
also invoked in support of judicial deference regarding administrative 
decisions. 
 
96. Enfield, 199 CLR paras. 40–42; see Kingham, supra note 95, at 51–52, 83; 
Gageler, supra note 94, at 155–56. 
97. See Kingham, supra note 95, at 83; Gageler, supra note 94, at 156; Barnes, 
supra note 40, at 131, 138. However, some authors now make the case for judicial 
deference to some executive interpretations of law with constitutional arguments that 
do not rest on new case law or legislation. See Boughey, supra note 43, at 41–53 (“[T]here 
are compelling arguments for judges to take expert administrators’ interpretations of the 
legislation they are charged with administering seriously and prefer those 
interpretations where there is a constructional choice to make.” (quotation from 
page 53)); see also John McMillan, Statutory Interpretation and Deference: An Executive 
Perspective, in INTERPRETING EXECUTIVE POWER, supra note 43, at 24, 27–33. 
98. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 75. 
99. From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 
53–86. Regarding the United States, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., 
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 282–
83 (2016); VERMEULE, supra note 41, at 155. 
100. Regarding Canada, see, for example, LEWANS, supra note 16, at 223. 
101. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 379–80. 
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Nevertheless, the risk of political influence is, ceteris paribus, 
higher where agencies or other administrative bodies are not 
independent from government. Political influence may lead them to 
consider elements that are irrelevant as they interpret statutes. 
Therefore, one could very well argue that such a risk requires an 
unrestricted judicial review of administrative decisions. In addition, an 
agency’s accountability from a citizen’s point of view is, at best, very 
indirect. In a parliamentary political system, the party or the parties 
in power can in principle be held accountable,102 but most voters will 
not cast their votes on the basis of the activities of one agency. In a 
presidential103 or semi-presidential political system, as in France for 
example, are the decisions made by an agency really an important 
aspect of the presidential or the parliamentary elections? 
In connection with agencies’ or other administrative bodies’ 
alleged political accountability, the separation of powers principle or 
similar considerations are sometimes invoked in order to support 
judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. 104  An 
ambiguous or unclear statute is supposed to raise policy issues—rather 
than strictly legal ones—to be addressed first and foremost by the 
executive. Indeed, constitutional or statutory interpretation is by no 
means mechanical. It is nonetheless one of the judicial tasks par 
excellence.105 The interpretation of statutes often involves—significant 
or modest—policy decisions;106 this observation eventually creates the 
impression that such decisions should be made by a body belonging to 
the executive branch rather than by a court. The initial remark is 
correct, the second not as much, not the least because questions of law 
 
102. On this issue and related ones regarding the United States, see Eskridge & 
Baer, supra note 78, at 1175–79. From a comparative perspective, see Robert C. 
Dolehide, A Comparative “Hard Look” at Chevron: What the United Kingdom and 
Australia Reveal About American Administrative Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1383, 1394–
95 (2010). 
103. See Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1383 (“American voters, in contrast [to voters 
in the United Kingdom and Australia], cannot attribute the blame or credit for 
administrative action quite as clearly: is Congress primarily responsible—since it passed 
the relevant legislation—or is the President responsible, since the Executive implements 
the legislation?”). 
104. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1273–74. 
105. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 740–
41. 
106. From a general or comparative perspective, see, for example, Reitz, supra 
note 4, at 286; T. R. S. Allan, Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of 
Judicial Review, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 41, 42 (2010) (“In public law, . . . questions of law 
are rarely pure: they come intertwined with considerations of policy and public interest 
remitted to other public officials to determine. In such cases, the law constitutes a 
boundary that the exercise of policy discretion must respect: judges should police the 
boundary while avoiding the temptation to step over it into the policy-making arena. The 
challenge is to determine precisely where the boundary lies.”). Regarding the United 
States, see, for example, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2152–54 (2016). 
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cannot be neatly distinguished from questions of policy.107 A general 
judicial deference does not derive from this inextricable reality. It 
would insulate the executive branch of government from sufficient 
checks and balances. In other words, it would be a stretch to suggest 
that judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases is required by 
the separation of powers principle. Interpreting a criminal statute, for 
instance, inevitably raises questions of policy, even if criminal law 
provisions are, ceteris paribus, deemed to be less open to interpretation 
than civil or administrative law provisions, due to the strict application 
of the principle of legality in criminal law. However, not only but most 
notably, due to fundamental rights, nobody seriously argues that 
courts should defer to prosecutors’ views or to agencies’ decisions in 
systems where the latter have decision-making powers in criminal or 
quasi-criminal matters. 
3. Independence 
In other countries, many agencies are independent from 
government. France, with its numerous independent administrative 
authorities (autorités administratives indépendantes), provides an 
illustrative example. Independence means, inter alia, that the agencies 
in question do not receive instructions from government and that their 
president or director cannot be removed for political reasons.108 Ceteris 
paribus, the risk of misinterpretation of a statute due to political 
influence or pressure is reduced. Consequently, judicial checks could 
be loosened. 
Independent agencies are organized as quasi-jurisdictional bodies 
in many countries, and, when they decide concrete cases, they follow, 
to an important extent, court-like proceedings. When they review 
agency decisions, appellate courts may take into account this 
institutional and procedural framework, which may lead to some 
deference.109 It is, however, questionable whether the deference really 
relates to statutory interpretation in such a context, especially when 
no particular agency expertise is necessary to interpret a given 
statutory provision. 
 
107. LEWANS, supra note 16, at 222 (regarding the interpretation of fundamental 
rights); see also Mathews, supra note 26, at 185–88; The Chevron Doctrine: 
Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 76, 84–86 (2016) (statement of Jack M. Beermann, Professor 
of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Bos. Univ.); Yoav Dotan, Deference and 
Disagreement in Administrative Law, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 761, 790-2 (2019). 
108. See, e.g., VINCENT MARTENET, ARCHITECTURE DES POUVOIRS: ENJEUX ET 
PERSPECTIVES POUR UN ÉTAT, UNE UNION D’ÉTATS ET LES NATIONS UNIES [ARCHITECTURE 
OF POWERS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR A STATE, A UNION OF STATES AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS] 9–15, 149–53 (2016). 
109. See infra Part VI.A. 
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On the other hand, reduced political control is sometimes seen as 
a strong argument in favor of unrestricted judicial review.110 The lack 
of political checks and balances is supposed to somehow be 
compensated by such a review. From this perspective, independence 
without political accountability and judicial deference do not mix well, 
but one should not forget that the nature of political control differs from 
the nature of judicial control.111 
4. Political Discretion 
In certain areas, decisions emanating from the executive branch 
are regarded as highly political and are, thus, subject to limited judicial 
review or are even exempt from it. The political question doctrine 
elaborated by the Supreme Court of the United States is well known.112 
Limits may indeed be justified, but one may feel more comfortable 
when they are firmly grounded in a country’s statutes113 or even in its 
constitution, as is the case in Switzerland.114 
In certain cases, the political process may be regarded as the most 
appropriate and legitimate or even as the only conceivable avenue in 
order to address all issues and interests at stake and to lead to 
eminently political decisions.115 Accordingly, little or no room is left to 
judicial review. The words “separation of powers”—and not simply 
“separation of expertise”—seem to be adequate in this context, though 
political or diplomatic expertise may also explain cases of total or 
partial insulation of the executive branch from judicial review.116 
Questions raised by decisions of the legislative or executive 
branches, which are totally or largely immune from judicial review, 
 
110. See infra Part V.E. 
111. See id. 
112. For a recent example, see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496–
2508 (2019) (holding that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions 
beyond the reach of the federal courts). 
113. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WAGSTAFF, TERROR DETENTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
US AND UK PERSPECTIVES 282 (2013) (“Parliamentary sovereignty addresses 
jurisdictional matters: for example, does the court have the authority to speak? Judicial 
deference is a subset: the court has the authority to speak, but sometimes it chooses not 
to do so.”). 
114. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, 
art. 189, § 4 (Switz.) (“Acts of the Federal Assembly [Parliament] or the Federal Council 
[Government] may not be challenged before the Federal Supreme Court. Exceptions may 
be provided for by law.”). 
115. From a comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 18, at 9. Regarding 
Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 379–83 (discussing the reluctance of Swiss 
courts to get involved in primarily political decisions and advocating for a judicial review 
of variable intensity). 
116. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 22 (2015) (“[T]he Court has mentioned both of the political branches 
in discussing international recognition, but it has done so primarily in affirming that the 
Judiciary is not responsible for recognizing foreign nations.”). 
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relate, first and foremost, to the—total or partial, actual or perceived—
lack of justiciability of these decisions, 117  rather than to judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. The distinction 
between lack of justiciability and judicial deference is, however, not 
clear-cut—indeed, the concepts may partially overlap. Additionally, as 
explained above,118 the interpretation of a statute often raises policy 
issues which are sometimes of great political significance. 
The political question doctrine in the United States or a similar 
fundamental limit to judicial review in another country should not play 
an important role, if any, in statutory interpretation cases involving 
agencies or other administrative bodies. It would be paradoxical to 
consider that decisions made by agencies are so political in nature that 
they exclude or strongly limit judicial review. This argument may be 
valid for decisions, such as planning decisions, taken by the legislature, 
the head of state or government, the government as a whole, or a 
department or ministry, but much less for an agency or, more 
generally, the bureaucracy.119 
Nevertheless, agencies or similar bodies may decide on important 
matters which are politically significant. They typically enjoy a high 
level of discretion when adopting appropriate measures regarding 
matters upon which they decide. As far as statutory interpretation is 
concerned, one may wonder whether they should have political 
discretion to interpret the statute that they administer. This type of 
discretion would not be based on the particular expertise that, for 
instance, an agency has, but solely or essentially on the political 
dimension or character of the decisions to be made. A note of caution is 
required here.120 When decisions have such a dimension, the risk of 
political interference is probably, ceteris paribus, higher. An agency or 
another body—especially if it is not independent within the executive 
branch—may be inclined to give great weight to the government’s 
current concerns or preferences when it politically matters,121 and, to 
 
117. From a comparative perspective, see DALY, supra note 16, at 267–86. 
Regarding Australia, see Kingham, supra note 95, at 53–68. Regarding Germany, see 
BOSCH, supra note 62, at 81. Regarding the United Kingdom, see Dominic McGoldrick, 
The Boundaries of Justiciability, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 981, 1018 (2010) (concluding, 
however, that “[t]he modern jurisprudential trend in relation to acts and decisions of the 
UK executive is to prefer an analysis of issues by reference to relative institutional 
competence or variable degrees of deference or weight rather than to non-justiciability.”). 
Regarding the United States, see Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–08. 
118. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
119. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 81, 386; Schmidt-Aßmann, 
supra note 60, ¶ 197. 
120. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 80; Schmidt-Aßmann, 
supra note 60, ¶ 197. 
121. Regarding the United States, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that 
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a certain extent, neglect what the legislature had previously decided 
on the basis of other concerns or preferences. Accordingly, judicial 
checks may actually protect the legislature.122 Any substantial judicial 
deference in this context would, at the very least, be questionable and 
could prove detrimental to the legislature. Political discretion may be 
granted by the legislature, but it cannot be created by the executive or 
the judiciary branches with the purpose of escaping legislative limits 
and obligations. 
Within the applicable international, constitutional, and other 
limits, discretion may of course be explicitly granted by the legislature 
or by the people to an agency or another administrative body in view 
of the political dimension of the decisions to be made on the basis of the 
relevant statute.123 In such a case, courts should interpret, without any 
particular deference, the constitutional provision or statute granting 
such discretion. In doing so, they can determine the scope, level, and 
limits of discretion and can thus ensure that provisions are not 
interpreted outside the bounds of the relevant statute. 
B. Optimal Allocation of Resources 
Judicial deference to administrative decisions may be understood 
as a way for a country to optimally allocate resources,124 which are 
usually limited, especially in small countries. Administrative officials 
 
the responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and 
uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous 
administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting their 
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs 
and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the 
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and 
evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.” (footnote omitted)). 
122. Regarding the strong potential of misalignment in the United States between 
the interests and objectives of Congress and those of agencies, which are primarily 
accountable to the President, see Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1394–99. If “the American 
system involves significant principal-agent problems between Congress and executive 
agencies, as well as between the President and the agencies,” id. at 1398, political 
accountability may indeed be unclear, and the related rationale for deference rather 
weak. But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND 
THE NEXT AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 161–63 (2020) (not distinguishing between agencies 
headed by Democrats or Republicans, on the one hand, and courts with a majority of 
judges appointed by Democrats or Republicans, on the other hand). One may, however, 
take into account the independence of the judiciary and, in this regard, make ceteris 
paribus a difference between agencies belonging to the executive branch and courts. 
123. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 82, 109–14. 
124. Regarding Germany, see Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 750–51. Regarding 
the United States, see Statement of Emily Hammond, supra note 86, at 72 (“The 
deference regimes are best understood as part of a larger constitutional framework, 
within which courts attempt to optimize their reviewing role, the legislature’s desires as 
expressed in the statutory mandate, and the executive branch’s policymaking 
discretion.”). 
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and staff have specific expertise, and even though judges control 
administrative decisions, they do not second-guess the reasonable 
interpretation of statutes.125 Judges often lack the expertise for a full 
assessment of the motives behind these decisions, and the systematic 
appointment of court experts in all cases is costly and causes undue 
delay. 
Moreover, judges may ultimately adopt a deferential attitude 
towards court experts appointed in a case: one form of deference would 
be replaced by another. Why would it be more legitimate for the courts 
to interpret the language of a statute by relying on private experts they 
appoint rather than on the supposedly expert administrative body? 
Isn’t the latter at least tied into the administrative structure subject, 
as a whole, to democratic control by the government and the 
legislature? In other words, it is not clear whether the second type—
deference to private persons acting as experts—is preferable to the 
first—deference to agencies or other bodies acting in the public 
interest. 126  A general judicial preference for expert analysis over 
agency analysis would raise important institutional concerns and 
prima facie would not be justifiable.127 A case-by-case approach would 
be more appropriate in this context. 
The optimal allocation of resources, which is considered here, is 
essentially linked to agencies’ or other bodies’ specific expertise. In this 
respect, it does not correspond to an additional independent reason 
supporting judicial deference to administrative statutory 
interpretation and derives from the main argument relating to 
agencies’ or other administrative bodies’ expertise and experience 
made previously.128 
C. Judicial Honesty, Transparency, and Humility 
By stating that they defer, to a certain extent, to statutory 
interpretation by administrative bodies, courts simply declare what 
they actually do and are able to do. Courts neither possess the same 
legitimacy as administrative bodies, nor do they possess the same level 
of non-legal expertise, and they do not hide this reality. In this 
 
125. For a rather radical approach on this issue, see LEWANS, supra note 16, at 
223 (“[J]udges should hone methods for scrutinizing administrative decisions, which 
focus on whether an administrative decision is transparent, intelligible and justifiable, 
instead of attempting to ascertain whether its substance matches their interpretation of 
the law all things considered.”). 
126. From a broader perspective, see, regarding the United States, ESKRIDGE, 
supra note 99, at 277 (“If statutory interpretation is usually a governance moment with 
consequences for public policy, then agency implementation, experience, and 
experiments offer lessons and insights that judges cannot easily find anywhere else.”). 
127. Regarding Italy, see JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 215. 
128. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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perspective, judicial deference can be regarded as an act of judicial 
honesty, transparency, and even humility. 129  Courts avoid the 
hypocrisy of saying that they do not defer in any way, while they know 
or should know that this does not reflect reality. 
Once again, this approach is most often intrinsically related to 
agencies’ or other bodies’ specific expertise. Judges know that they are 
not able to fully correct the asymmetry of non-legal expertise when 
they review all or part of administrative decisions. Their honesty and 
transparency in this respect also send a signal to the legislature, which 
can adopt corrective measures or, expressly or tacitly, approve such a 
limit of judicial review. This could lead to the creation of specialized 
courts or to a budget increase of the judiciary, allowing for the 
recruitment of staff specialized in non-legal matters or the frequent 
appointment of court experts. 130  In short, transparency may open 
appropriate—and possibly fruitful—inter-branch dialogue. 
The European Commission is not supposed to benefit from any 
judicial deference, for instance, with respect to legal questions in 
competition law cases, except when it applies its own soft law.131 
Hence, Union courts assess the appropriateness of interpretations of 
vague legal notions made by the Commission or other bodies in the 
process of law enforcement.132 A tendency towards strengthening the 
intensity of judicial review can henceforth be observed.133 Still, “the 
Commission’s record in persuading the EU Courts to accept the 
theories it puts forward is significant.”134 Therefore, theory may not 
completely match reality.135 Of course, a note of caution is probably 
justified here, as EU courts may be persuaded without exercising 
 
129. See McMillan, supra note 97, at 27, 33 (“In a basic sense, a practice of 
deference could be viewed as simply an exercise in common sense and professionalism. 
It involves recognition that one’s skill set may be limited and would benefit from the 
practical wisdom of others.”). 
130. See JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 201–17, 570. 
131. See, e.g., Maciej Bernatt, Transatlantic Perspective on Judicial Deference in 
Administrative Law, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275, 311–14 (2016); Heike Schweitzer, 
Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW: ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE 491, 497–98, 531–33, 537–38 (Ioannis Lianos & 
Damien Geradin eds., 2013). 
132. See, e.g., Mariolina Eliantonio, Deference to the Administration in Judicial 
Review: The European Union, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, supra note 16, at 165, 171; Mariusz Baran, The Scope of EU Courts’ Jurisdiction 
and Review of Administrative Decisions: The Problem of Intensity Control of Legality, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 292, 307 (Carol Harlow, Päivi Leino 
& Giacinto della Cananea eds., 2017). 
133. See, for instance, Case T-679/14, Teva UK v. Comm’n, 2018 EUR-Lex 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:919 paras. 165–244 (Dec. 12, 2018), regarding the definition of the 
“concept of a restriction of competition by object.” 
134. Bernatt, supra note 131, at 323. 
135. On this issue, see, for example, Damien Gerard, Breaking the EU Antitrust 
Enforcement Deadlock: Re-Empowering the Courts?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 457, 470–71 (2011). 
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deference. That being said, following a given economic theory may have 
an influence on the interpretation of competition law.136 
D. Other Considerations 
Some areas are very complex, and an administrative body may be 
better equipped than a court—in terms of personal resources for 
instance— to amass the relevant information and take account of all 
stakeholder views before making a decision. 137  Complexity, as a 
practical justification for subsequent judicial deference, is, however, 
tied to expertise.138 One may regard complexity as an independent 
justification, but this would, first and foremost, relate to fact-finding 
or to the adoption of regulations,139 bylaws, or guidelines, and less to 
the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes, especially in 
adjudications. Legal interpretation, including of complex norms, is one 
of the courts’ core competencies. 
Along the same lines, participation of interested parties in the 
administrative decision-making process may give rise to a particular 
procedural legitimacy,140  which courts would then have to respect. 
Here again, one may wonder whether this potential justification for 
judicial deference really applies to the interpretation of statutes. An 
affirmative answer should not be excluded, but would most probably 
flow from the additional knowledge and expertise gained as a result of 
the decision-making process. 
Finally, when they believe that judicial deference to 
administrative decisions may be justified in some cases, judges should, 
in principle, address this issue and try to set criteria in this respect in 
order to avoid or mitigate risks of arbitrariness, and to open a 
transparent debate in this respect. 141  In Brazil, for instance, a 
 
136. See, e.g., Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 507 (“In competition law—fact-
intensive by nature and characterized by broad and open legal terms meant to enable 
the courts to translate economic theory into law—the lines between the evaluation of the 
facts, the interpretation of the law and an assessment whether the facts adduced suffice 
to substantiate a legal claim can easily blur. The frequently broad legal concepts gain 
their full meaning in interaction with economic theory and in their case-by-case 
application to a given set of situation-specific facts.”). 
137. On this issue, see DALY, supra note 16, at 89–110. 
138. See id. at 89–90, 95, 99. 
139. See id. at 252–53 (“Expertise might very well be relevant to the resolution of 
major questions of policy, for example, whether genetically modified foods should be 
permitted or not. Complexity, similarly, might be relevant: the question of how to 
regulate tobacco products and how any regulation would interact with existing 
regulatory regimes, is a polycentric question which might call for resolution by a 
procedurally flexible expert body.”). 
140. See id. at 114–31. 
141. Regarding New Zealand, see Bree Huntley, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Interpretations: Lessons for New Zealand from the United States?, 26 N.Z. U. L. REV. 791, 
817–18 (2015) (“One reason that more open engagement with the issues governing 
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consistent case law on the interaction between independent agencies 
and courts is missing,142 even though higher federal courts sometimes 
tend to show deference to these agencies.143 Brazilian courts have not, 
for instance, developed a doctrine of judicial deference similar to the 
Chevron deference in the United States. The same can be said about 
South Korea, where judicial deference can actually be perceived in 
some administrative cases.144 Finally, in China, judicial deference to 
administrative decisions exists, but courts have not yet adopted 
consistent methodologies in this regard.145 
 
allocation of interpretive authority would be preferable is it might be expected to lead to 
better decision making. Judges forced to articulate why they are deferring, or not 
deferring, to an administrative interpretation must evaluate the arguments for and 
against deference, rather than relying on their instinctive conclusions. As well, such 
articulation can serve as a guide to other judges, so that over time a broad consensus 
emerges as to the relevance of various factors.”). 
142. See Eduardo Jordão, Globalization and Convergence in Judicial Review: What 
Can We Learn from the Case of Brazil?, 69 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO E 
CONSTITUCIONAL [ADMIN. & CONST. L. REV.] 23, 30 (2017) (“[T]he adoption of Chevron 
orientation is still unclear. The doctrine has seduced the academia and many articles 
have been written on the topic, most of which urging Brazilian courts to adopt a similar 
doctrine. But empirical studies have shown that actual judicial deference to 
administrative agencies’ decisions is still rare.”); see also Eduardo Jordão & Renato 
Toledo Cabral Jr., A teoria da deferência e a prática judicial: um estudo empírico sobre o 
controle do TJRJ à AGENERSA [Theory of Deference and Judicial Practice: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Review of AGENERSA (Independent Regulatory 
Commission of Energy and Basic Sanitation of the State of Rio de Janeiro) by TJRJ 
(Court of Justice of the State of Rio de Janeiro)], 4 REVISTA DE ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS 
[REV. OF INSTITUTIONAL STUD.] 537, 565–66 (2018). 
143. See Mariana Mota Prado, Introdução [Introduction], in O JUDICIÁRIO E O 
ESTADO REGULADOR BRASILEIRO [COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE] 7, 11 
(Mariana Mota Prado ed., 2016); Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhão, A revisão 
judicial de decisões de agências regulatórias: jurisdição exclusiva? [Judicial Review of 
Decisions of Regulatory Agencies: Exclusive Jurisdiction?], in COURTS AND THE 
BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 25, 25 & 29; Paulo Furquim de 
Azevedo, Revisão judicial de decisões antitruste: incentivos para acordos ? [Judicial 
Review of Antitrust Decisions: Incentives for Settlements?], in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN 
REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 81, 89 & 99; Patrícia Sampaio & Ricardo 
Morishita Wada, A regulação e o Judiciário: o caso do setor de eletricidade [Regulation 
and the Judiciary: The Case of the Electricity Sector], in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN 
REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 135, 149; Alexandre D. Faraco, Caio Mario da 
Silva Pereira Neto & Diogo R. Coutinho, A judicialização de políticas regulatórias de 
telecomunicações no Brasil [Judicial Review of Telecommunications Policies in Brazil], 
in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 161, 176–78. 
144. See Dong Won Kim, Finding a Model of Judicial Review for Administration: 
Implications from the Chevron Case for Separation of Powers in South Korea, 21 INT’L 
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 147, 153–60 (2016). 
145. Qinwei Gao, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in China, in 
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 105, 128–29 
(“[I]t is necessary for the courts to unify the standard of judicial review. In the course of 
judicial review, the Chinese courts will have more experience to establish a reasonable 
spectrum of scrutiny: in the field of policy making, the courts respect the margin of 
appreciation of administrative organs; in the field of expertise, such as food safety and 
risk regulation, the courts also loose the intensity of review; stricter scrutiny could be 
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V. THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
The separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and 
balances (subpart A), the rule of law or the not-too-distant—though not 
synonymous—notion of “État de droit” (subpart B), the constitutional 
role of the judiciary (subpart C), as well as procedural safeguards 
(subpart D) usually support the case against a general and broad 
judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Agency 
independence (subpart E), when it exists, and the risk of wrong 
incentives, as well as other considerations (subpart F), may also 
support the case against judicial deference. 
A. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 
The separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and 
balances are invoked to oppose judicial deference to administrative 
statutory interpretation. 146  Without full effective control of the 
judiciary over administrative decisions, checks needed for the 
executive would be insufficient, and the separation of powers principle 
would be disregarded. However, one has to be clear about how the 
separation of powers is affected by such deference. In the United 
States, it is not so much “a judicially orchestrated shift of power from 
Congress to the Executive Branch,”147 but rather an eventual shift of 
power to this branch from the judiciary with the supposed assent of the 
Congress.148  
This approach can perhaps be followed when general judicial 
deference is considered, including with respect to decisions of deep 
social, political, or economic significance.149 However, some deference, 
 
applied when administrative organs make a decision on punitive penalty or the 
deprivation of freedom or property rights of citizens.”). 
146. Regarding the United Kingdom, see, for example, Trevor R. S. Allan, Human 
Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “Due Deference,” 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 671, 675, 
677–82, 695 (2006). Regarding the United States, see, for example, Cynthia R. Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456, 516–28 (1989); Jack. M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron 
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 836–-37 (2010); Statement of Jonathan Turley, supra note 58, at 
15. For a literature review, see Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron 
Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110–20 (2018). 
147. Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2150 (referring to the Chevron case). 
148. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring). See also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1616 n.12. 
149. Regarding the United States, see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484–87 (2015). The absence of 
deference on a question of deep “economic and political significance” which is central to 
the statutory scheme at stake is an important exception to the Chevron doctrine. It 
remains to be seen whether the exception will overshadow the rule since it is difficult to 
delineate the limits to the exception. 
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based on several criteria, does not shake the foundation of the 
separation of powers, especially when administrative decisions are still 
reviewed by courts to an important extent. 150  Montesquieu, for 
instance, did not insist on the process of interpreting laws: the 
judiciary almost mechanically applied them to concrete cases.151 
Paradoxically, the separation of powers principle and the concept 
of checks and balances are sometimes invoked to support judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation, as we have 
seen.152  A too-extensive judicial review of administrative decisions 
would give too much power to the judiciary and would create an 
imbalance in favor of the latter. This goes to show that considerations 
based on the separation of powers principle, the concept of checks and 
balances, or even a theory of democracy are, if not irrelevant, 
ambivalent.153 
B. Rule of Law and “État de droit” 
The rule of law and the related concept of “État de droit”—
“Rechtsstaat” in German—are also referred to by courts, judges, and 
scholars widely or totally opposed to judicial deference to 
 
150. From a comparative perspective, see JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 536–37. 
Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1678 (“But if Congress 
wants agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes, it can grant them that authority [so long 
as that, and no more, is what it is granting]. If Congress wants to deny agencies 
interpretive authority and require an independent judicial role, it can do that as well. 
Constitutional objections to the Chevron framework are unconvincing.” (footnote 
omitted)); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term – Foreword: 1930s Redux: 
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 93 (2017) (“Unless such 
delegations are unconstitutional, the constitutional separation of powers system 
requires that the courts honor congressional policy choices. And honoring congressional 
choices to delegate means deferring to agency judgments within the sphere of the 
agency’s constitutionally delegated authority.” (footnote omitted)). 
151. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 160 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) (“Among the three powers . . 
., that of judging is in some fashion, null.”); see Charles Eisenmann, L’Esprit des Lois et 
la Séparation des Pouvoirs [The Spirit of the Laws and the Separation of Powers] (1933), 
reprinted in ÉCRITS DE THÉORIE DU DROIT, DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET D’IDÉES 
POLITIQUES [WRITINGS IN THEORY OF LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL IDEAS] 
565, 575 (Charles Leben ed., 2002); see also Zeev Segal, Judicial Activism Vis-à-Vis 
Judicial Restraint: An Israeli Viewpoint, 47 TULSA L. REV. 319, 321 (2011). 
152. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
153. See Zhu, supra note 18, at 8, 16; Tolley, supra note 84, at 432–34; see also 
PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING 
AND THE REGULATORY STATE 339–40 (2018) (“It is not clear that simply dropping the 
Chevron doctrine would help live up to the values of constitutional democracy. If the 
courts did not defer to agency interpretation . . ., they, rather than the agency, would 
become the de facto legislators, as occurred in competition policy: hardly an advance in 
terms of democratic legitimacy.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–16. 
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administrative statutory interpretation. 154  In France, the “État de 
droit,” the role of courts—ultimately of the Court of Cassation and the 
Council of State—as well as procedural safeguards are considered to 
prohibit any judicial deference to independent administrative 
authorities’ statutory interpretation.155 In Finland, the principles of 
legality and effective judicial protection, the right to a fair trial, and 
other fundamental rights are usually interpreted as preventing this 
type of deference. 156  Once a statute is enacted in Israel, its 
interpretation by agencies does not, as a rule, receive judicial deference 
since the view from the bench is that the courts’ role is to interpret the 
law.157 A recent decision of the Supreme Court appears, however, to 
lean toward a Chevron-type doctrine,158 though its actual meaning is 
debated.159 Moreover, it is very difficult for now to foresee whether this 
decision will remain isolated or establish an important precedent.160 
Both the rule of law and the “État de droit” imply, among other 
things, public authorities’ subjection to the applicable laws and the 
independence of the judiciary. These notions are, however, imprecise 
 
154. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Ronald A. Cass, Vive La 
Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1322–23, 1328–29 (2015). 
155. See, e.g., Jean-Louis Autin, Autorités administratives indépendantes, 
démocratie et État de droit [Independent Administrative Authorities, Democracy and 
Rule of Law], 93 DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉ [L. & SOC’Y] 285, 293–94 (“État de droit” is translated 
here as “Rule of Law,” as there is no exact equivalent in English; one should bear in mind 
that this translation is imprecise); JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 41–45, 148–49; see also 
Bertrand du Marais, Les règles juridiques matérielles applicables aux autorités 
indépendantes [Material Legal Rules Applicable to Independent Authorities], in LE 
MODÈLE DES AUTORITÉS DE RÉGULATION INDÉPENDANTES EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE 
[THE MODEL OF INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES IN FRANCE AND IN GERMANY] 
231, 249–51 (Gérard Marcou & Johannes Masing eds., 2011). For a general view on 
countries with a civil law tradition, see Craig, supra note 14, at 401 (“The conceptual 
premise of US, Canadian law, and to a lesser extent UK law, that some interpretive 
autonomy over legal issues should be accorded to agencies, whether on grounds of 
delegation, expertise or accountability, would in general not be accepted by those [EU 
Member States] in the civil law tradition.”). As we shall see, some civil law countries like 
Germany, Italy and Switzerland, grant administrative bodies some statutory 
interpretation autonomy. 
156. See Olli Mäenpää, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in 
Finland, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 
181, 188–89, 199–200. 
157. See, e.g., HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of the Interior, 53(2) PD 728 
paras. 8–11 (1999) (Isr.). On the doctrine of reasonableness in Israel, see, for example, 
Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Open and Closed Judicial Review of Agency Action: The 
Conflicting U.S. and Israeli Approaches, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 549–50 (2016). 
158. CA 7488/16 Seligman v. Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. paras. 33–34 (a 
further hearing of the case by an extended panel has been ordered, FH 4960/18, and is 
currently pending; last checked Feb. 21, 2021). On this decision, see Margit Cohn, 
Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel, in DEFERENCE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 231, 265–66. 
159. See Cohn, supra note 158, at 266. 
160. See id. at 267. 
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and elusive. They would likely be misread if interpreted so as to 
prevent any form of judicial deference in any statutory interpretation 
cases.161 In New Zealand nevertheless, the Court of Appeal stated that 
it is “fundamental and constitutionally important” to the preservation 
of the rule of law that courts have the last word on questions of law.162 
Accordingly, courts do not defer to statute interpretation by agencies. 
Some scholars are, however, in favor of a judicial deference doctrine 
similar to the one existing in Canada; they consider that there would 
be no legal obstacle to having this kind of deference in New Zealand as 
well.163 
Extensive self-restraint on the part of the courts could become 
particularly problematic if and when it would make effective judicial 
control over the executive branch difficult or, a fortiori, illusory. Along 
these lines, the rule of law may limit or forbid judicial deference “on 
general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a 
whole,” 164  providing that these terms do not create a catch-all 
instrument for courts. Besides, even if its nature differs from judicial 
review, parliamentary control over agencies is rather weak in many 
democracies for reasons that vary from one country to the next. 
In short, an unchecked executive branch endangers or even 
collides with the rule of law and the “État de droit.” Limited judicial 
deference in statutory interpretation cases, however, does not reach 
 
161. Regarding countries with a Common Law tradition, see Hanna Wilberg & 
Mark Elliott, Deference on Questions of Law: A Survey of Taggart’s Contribution and 
Themes in the Wider Literature, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, 
supra note 89, at 197, 214 (“[N]one of the major common-law systems actually treats 
every question of statutory interpretation as a matter that must inevitably attract 
correctness review. It follows that the real fault-line in the debate relates not to the 
question whether deference is ever appropriate. Rather, the principal site of 
disagreement is found in relation to questions pertaining to the circumstances in which 
deference is appropriate and the means by which deference, when it is appropriate, 
should be delivered.”). 
162. Wool Board Disestablishment Co. Ltd. v. Saxmere Co. Ltd. [2010] NZCA 513, 
[2011] 2 NZLR 442 at [116–17, 224] (N.Z.); see, e.g., Aronson, supra note 91, at 257–59, 
260; Huntley, supra note 141, at 793–97; see also Hanna Wilberg, Deference on Relevance 
and Purpose? Wrestling with the Law/Discretion Divide, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY 
OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 263. 
163. See Wilberg & Elliott, supra note 161, at 209; Michael Taggart, The 
Contribution of Lord Cooke to Scope of Review Doctrine in Administrative Law: A 
Comparative Common Law Perspective, in THE STRUGGLE FOR SIMPLICITY IN THE LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD COOKE OF THORNDON 189, 215–19 (Paul Rishworth ed., 
1997); see also Huntley, supra note 141, at 817–18. 
164. See the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 58–62. But 
see Paul Daly, Vavilov Hits the Road, ADMIN. L. MATTERS (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/02/04/vavilov-hits-the-road/ 
[https://perma.cc/MK9V-55QX] (archived Sep. 29, 2020) (“The category most apt to be 
expanded after Vavilov is surely the ‘questions of central importance to the legal system’ 
category. But the narrow rule of law basis for the correctness categories does not provide 
a solid foundation for such arguments.”). 
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these dangerous limits.165 The historical and legal context prevailing 
in a country may of course lead to another conclusion. Accordingly, the 
rule of law and the “État de droit” must be contextualized. 
C. Constitutional Role of the Judiciary 
Many constitutions define the role or the roles of the judiciary in 
general terms. Very few of them expressly mention that the judiciary 
interprets the law without limits. Thus, constitutions are usually 
vague as far as statute interpretation is concerned. They do not address 
the question of judicial deference regarding decisions made by other 
branches. 
In some countries, such as Mexico, courts consider that the 
constitution 166  assigns them the task to interpret statutes and, 
consequently, that they cannot defer to agencies in this respect. In 
Argentina, 167  federal courts see one of their roles as interpreting 
statutes in federal or constitutional controversies and, thus, would not 
accept to defer to agencies in this regard. In other countries, such as 
Belgium and Spain, no debate on this issue seems to exist. 
In South Africa, the constitutional provision guaranteeing 
administrative justice, as well as the legacy of apartheid, may explain, 
at least partly, why South African courts are reluctant to defer to 
statute interpretation by agencies.168 Section 33 (“Just Administrative 
Action”) of the South African Constitution169  notably provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair” (par. 1) and that national legislation 
“must provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, 
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal” (par. 3/a). 
In this country, there is indeed no judicial deference to administrators 
 
165. Regarding Canada, see David Dyzenhaus, Dignity in Administrative Law: 
Judicial Deference in a Culture of Justification, 17 REV. CONST. STUD. 87, 107–14 (2012), 
focusing on the idea of “deference as respect”. Regarding Canada and the United States, 
see Daly, supra note 14, at 720 and, from a broader perspective, DALY, supra note 16, at 
291–93. Regarding the United States, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1169–71. 
From a general perspective, see Paul Craig, Judicial Review and Judicial Deference, in 
CONTROLLING EU AGENCIES: THE RULE OF LAW IN A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 98, 99–100, 102–03 (Miroslava Scholten & Alex Brenninkmeijer eds., 2020). 
166. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 art. 103; see also Ley 
Orgánica del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa [Administrative Justice 
Federal Tribunal Organic Act] [LOTFJA] art. 3, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 
18-07-2016 (Mex.). 
167. See Pedro Aberastury, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in 
Argentina, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, 
at 23, 30–36. 
168. See CORA HOEXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 147–55, 353–55 
(2nd ed. 2012); Tolley, supra note 84, at 430–32, 438 (2003). 
169. S. AFR. CONST.,  1996 § 33. 
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when it comes to the interpretation of legislation.170 In a few cases, 
courts have admittedly shown reluctance to interfere with complex 
decisions taken by administrators with specific expertise, but the 
deference did not relate to statute interpretation.171 
In other countries, the constitution is generally regarded as 
allocating the function of statute interpretation to courts without 
allowing them to defer, in this regard, to administrative bodies. 
Australia seems to provide a good illustration in this regard.172 Also, 
given the particular constitutional framework existing in Sweden, with 
wide powers granted to administrative courts, judicial deference to 
statute interpretation by agencies does not seem to exist in this 
country. 173  In India, the question of judicial deference to statute 
interpretation by agencies does not seem to arise “since the judiciary 
inherently believes that the task of adjudicating in all aspects is a 
judicial function alone.” 174  That said, in the interpretation of tax 
statutes, the Indian Supreme Court does not admit to the use of 
deference, but to the use of admissible and significant aid for 
interpretation: 
a uniform and consistent departmental practice arising out of construction 
placed upon an ambiguous statute by the highest executive officers at or near 
the time of its enactment and continuing for a long period of time is also an 
admissible aid to the proper construction of the statute by the court and would 
not be disregarded except for cogent reasons.175 
 
170. See Marshall NO v. Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2009 (6) 
SA 246 (CC) paras. 3, 9, 10 (S. Afr.) (rejecting the argument that “a unilateral practice 
of one part of the executive arm of government” should play any role in determining the 
meaning of a statutory provision relating to VAT and holding that the meaning of such 
a provision has to be interpreted objectively and independently by courts); see also 
HOEXTER, supra note 168, at 282–90 (discussing the notion of “error of law” which is the 
ground of review that specifically addresses wrong or mistaken statutory interpretation 
by administrators). 
171. See, e.g., High Court of South Africa May 9, 2005, Joubert v. National 
Commissioner for the South African Police Service (6543/2004) [2005] ZAGPHC 238 
(decision of medical board); Cora Hoexter, A Rainbow of One Colour? Judicial Review on 
Substantive Grounds in South African Law, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 163, 170–71 & 192. 
172. See, e.g., Kingham, supra note 95, at 61–62; Cane, supra note 91, at 221–33, 
237–38; PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL 
COMPARISON 217–18, 230, 235 (2016); Freckelton, supra note 94, at 64–66; Barnes, 
supra note 40, at 133. But see Gageler, supra note 94, at 154–56. 
173. See, e.g., Henrik Wenander, Full Judicial Review or Administration 
Discretion? A Swedish Perspective on Deference to the Administration, in DEFERENCE TO 
THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 405, 407–11, 413–14. 
174. Roopashi Khatri, Administrative Agency and Statutory Interpretation: A 
Comparative Analysis, 1.1 COMP. CONST. L & ADMIN. L.Q. 32, 41 (2013). 
175. Jagdamba Indus. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1988) 69 STC 1 para. 14 (SC) 
(India) (holding that the statute at issue was silent on the matter at hand). 
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The Court of Justice of the European Union ensures “that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.”176 
This “constitutional” mandate means that questions of law arising 
from the interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Articles 101 and 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are subject 
to full and comprehensive judicial review.177 
In sum, the constitutional role of the judiciary is, to a certain 
extent, a question of interpretation. Courts themselves have a say in 
this respect. Accordingly, they define the outlines of their interpretive 
power. In Hong Kong, for instance, courts have not developed a 
doctrine of deference to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.178 A key 
reason may be that Hong Kong courts are of British tradition, and since 
the British courts have not developed a doctrine akin to Chevron 
deference, courts in Hong Kong have been firmly of the view that 
legislative interpretation is a question of law for them to decide. This 
assessment is also valid for Singapore, 179  even though various 
arguments are brought forward in favor of a deference doctrine.180 
In most countries, then, one cannot say that the constitutional 
role of the judiciary clearly prohibits judicial deference to 
administrative statutory interpretation. The way the judiciary itself 
interprets its constitutional or institutional role may go in this 
direction, but it is a peculiar form of judicial self-restraint (i.e., a self-
imposed restraint on the ability to defer). 
D. Procedural Safeguards 
International, constitutional, statutory, or other procedural 
safeguards often require courts to fully review the merits of each case 
by assessing all relevant facts in addition to the correct interpretation 
of the law and its application to the facts. Case law from the European 
Court of Human Rights based on the first paragraph of Article 6 of the 
ECHR lays down such a rule. 181  Article 47 of the Charter of 
 
176. Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 326/13) art. 19(1). 
177. Bernatt, supra note 131, at 311–12; Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 498. 
178. See Cora Chan, A Principled Approach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong, 
in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 203, 224, 
227–28. 
179. See Eugene K. B. Tan, ‘The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is 
Contrary to the Rule of Law”: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singapore, in 
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 379, 397. 
180. See id. at 396–400; see also Eugene K. B. Tan, Commercial Judicial Review 
in Singapore: Strategic or Spontaneous?, 2020 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
448, 472-77. 
181. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance, A. 
Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 43509/08 paras. 61–67 (Sept. 
27, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["in%20re%20a.%20
menarini"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union is interpreted the same 
way by the Court of Justice of the European Union.182 
When such a procedural safeguard exists, it gives rise to two sets 
of fundamental questions which are normally answered by courts. 
Firstly, what is the actual scope of the safeguard in question? Does it 
cover all fields of law, including administrative law interpreted and 
applied by agencies in the first instance? For example, the protection 
of Article 6 of the ECHR extends to several areas of administrative law, 
but not to all of them.183 
Secondly, does a full review really exclude any form of deference, 
for instance when the interpretation of a statute is intrinsically linked 
to complex technical, economic, or scientific issues? The European 
Court of Human Rights does not completely close the door to some kind 
of judicial deference in such a situation: 
In assessing whether, in a given case, the extent of the review carried out by the 
domestic courts was sufficient, the Court has held that it must have regard to 
the powers of the judicial body in question and to such factors as: (a) the subject-
matter of the decision appealed against, and in particular, whether or not it 
concerned a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and 
whether it involved the exercise of administrative discretion and, if so, to what 
extent; (b) the manner in which that decision was arrived at, in particular, the 
procedural guarantees available in the proceedings before the administrative 
body; and (c) the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds 
of appeal.184 
 
-106438"]} [https://perma.cc/SL28-6TSJ] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); see also, e.g., Zhu, 
supra note 16, at 15; Jean-David Dreyfus, Les autorités de régulation indépendantes au 
croisement des droits administratif, civil et pénal [Independent Regulation Authorities at 
the Crossroads of Administrative, Civil and Criminal Law], in THE MODEL OF 
INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES, supra note 155, at 297, 310–12; Vincent 
Martenet, Le contrôle judiciaire et la surveillance politique des autorités administratives 
indépendantes [Judicial Control and Political Oversight of Independent Administrative 
Authorities], in LES AUTORITÉS ADMINISTRATIVES INDÉPENDANTES [INDEPENDENT 
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES] 183, 191–99 (François Bellanger & Thierry Tanquerel 
eds., 2011). 
182. See, for instance, Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA v. Comm’n, 2014 Eur-Lex 
CELEX 62012CJ0295, paras. 51–57 (July 10, 2014). 
183. On the scope of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, see 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CRIMINAL LIMB) paras. 11–52 
(Dec. 31, 2020); EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CIVIL LIMB) 
paras. 1–75 (Aug. 31, 2020). 
184. On this issue, see, for example, Martenet, supra note 181, at 196–99; see also, 
for instance, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R.  App. Nos. 
55391/13, 57728/13 & 74041/13 para. 179 (Nov. 6, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Ramos%20Nunes%20de%20Carvalho%20e%2
0Sá%20v.%20Portugal"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],
"itemid":["001-187507"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9D6U-6PFK] 
(archived Dec. 10, 2020); Fazia Ali v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 40378/10, para. 78 
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In Italy, for example, the intensity of judicial review over 
independent authorities’ decisions has significantly increased during 
the last twenty years.185 This evolution is notably due to the European 
Union principle of effective judicial protection,186 as well as to Article 6 
of the ECHR and Article 113 of the Italian Constitution which 
provides, in its first paragraph, that “[t]he judicial safeguarding of 
rights and legitimate interests before the bodies of ordinary or 
administrative justice is always permitted against acts of the public 
administration.” 187  Since an important decision of the Council of 
State, 188  Italy’s highest administrative court, the existence of an 
indefinite legal term in a statute does not alone justify any judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation. The Italian 
Supreme Court of Cassation, the highest civil and criminal court, 
continues however to consider that judicial deference may exist when 
a court faces complex economic and technical evaluations made by an 
 
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Fazia
%20Ali%20v.%20The%20United%20Kingdom"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHA
MBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-158031"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/K5GX-7E52] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 43800/12 para. 98 (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-157348"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/3PSW-NWCW] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. 
Cyprus, App. Nos. 32181/04 & 35122/05, para. 154 (July 21, 2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Sigma%20Radio%20Television%20Ltd%20v.%
20Cyprus"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["00
1-105766"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6EED-SPPL] (archived Dec. 10, 
2020).  
185. See Vera Parisio, Judicial Review of Italian Independent Authorities Acts: A 
Short Overview, in THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 271, 283–86 (Jean-Bernard 
Auby ed., 2019); Giacinto della Cananea, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in 
Italy: Beyond Deference?, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
supra note 16, at 271, 275–85; JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 165–75. 
186. In Italy, see Codice del processo amministrativo [Code of Administrative 
Trial], Decreto legislativo [Legislative Decree], July 2, 2010, No. 104, art. 1, translated 
at http://www.unaep.com/download/the-code-of-administrative-trial-codice-del-processo-
amministrativo-in-lingua-inglese/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/L7N7-
G9S9] (archived Oct. 9, 2020). 
187. Art. 133 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.), translated at https://www.senato.it/
documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4RD8-3G7T] (archived Oct. 9, 2020). 
188. Cons. Stato, sez. un., 10 marzo 2003, n. 926/04, 23-26 (It.); CONSIGLIO DI 
STATO [COUNCIL OF STATE], UFFICIO STUDI [RESEARCH DEPARTMENT], AUTORITÀ 
INDIPENDENTI E SINDACATO GIURISDIZIONALE [INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW] 7–8 (2017). See Vera Parisio, Contrôle juridictionnel des actes des Autorités 
indépendantes italiennes: un bref aperçu [Judicial Review of Acts of Italian Independent 
Authorities: A Short Overview], 19 FEDERALISMI.IT – RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 
ITALIANO, COMPARATO, EUROPEO [REV. OF ITALIAN, COMPAR. & EUR. PUB. L.] 1, 22 
(Oct. 10, 2018); JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 174–75. 
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independent authority.189 For their part, the administrative courts and 
the Council of State, which can appoint technical experts,190 notably 
control whether a given independent authority’s statutory 
interpretation remains within the margin permitted by the indefinite 
legal term at stake, but are not allowed to substitute their own 
judgement for that of the authority.191 Since complex evaluations made 
by the authority may influence the interpretation of law and since the 
appointment of experts is not systematic, some form of judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation or, at least, some 
judicial restraint in this respect may de facto still exist in 
administrative cases in Italy.192 
In sum, procedural safeguards usually have an impact on the 
issue of judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. 
In this respect, the exact intensity of judicial review is determined at 
the last instance by a court, be it supranational, supreme, or 
constitutional. 
E. Independence 
Agencies’ independence has already been mentioned as a 
potential—though not particularly convincing—argument for judicial 
deference in statutory interpretation cases.193 One could also claim 
that said independence equates to a lack of political control and 
reduced accountability in this respect. Judicial deference would lead to 
a situation where unelected bureaucrats are, to a certain extent, 
insulated from political accountability and liability as well as from 
effective judicial review. Appropriate and efficient checks and balances 
would thus be missing. Such an institutional context is therefore seen 
 
189. Cass., sez. un. 20 gennaio 2014, n. 1013, paras. 4.1–4.3. See, e.g., Parisio, 
supra note 188, at 22; Marina Tavassi, Judicial Review of Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2 
ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 144, 160–61 (2015). 
190. Art. 19, 63 § 4, 67 Codice del processo amministrativo [Code of Administrative 
Trial], Decreto legislativo [Legislative Decree] July 2, 2010, n. 104 (It.). 
191. Cons. Stato, sez. un. 26  maggio 2017, nn. 02481/2017, 26–27 (para. 5.1.2); 
Cons. Stato, sez. un. 24 ottobre 2014, n.. 05274, 6 (para. 4); Cons. Stato, sez. un. 8  agosto 
2014 , n. 4228, 4–5 (para. 4.1). See, e.g., Parisio, supra note 188, at 22–23; Mario Filice, 
Il sindacato giurisdizionale sull’attività delle Autorità indipendenti [Judicial Review 
Over the Activity of the Independent Authorities], 2015 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO [J.  ADMIN. L.] 559, 568–69 (2015); Mario Siragusa, Judicial Review of 
Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 144, 150–51, 157–58 (2015). 
192. See Filice, supra note 191, at 569; Roberto Giovagnoli, Judicial Review of 
Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 144, 145–46 (2015); see also 
CLAUDIO CONTESSA, FORME E METODI DEL SINDACATO GIURISDIZIONALE SUGLI ATTI DELLE 
AUTORITÀ INDIPENDENTI [FORMS AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF THE 
INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES], PUBLICATION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE 21 (2018). 
193. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
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as unfavorable to judicial deference to statute interpretation by 
agencies.194 
The idea that the intensity of judicial review is inversely 
proportional to the intensity of political control can be misleading, if 
not inaccurate. They differ in nature. One should not forget that a 
debate on judicial deference to statute interpretation by agencies arises 
both in countries where agencies or other administrative bodies are 
independent as well as in others where they are not.195 
Agencies’ independence is a double-edged sword with regard to 
judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases. The lack of political 
accountability may prevent such a deference, but the reduced risk of 
political influence in the decision-making process may support it. 
Accordingly, it seems difficult to give much weight to this element. 
Empirical research in a given country—with a view to understand 
how institutions, their personnel, rules, or procedures actually operate 
and what effects they have—may indeed show that the lack of political 
accountability is more problematic than the risk of political influence. 
Regardless, can courts really rely on empirical studies that are often 
accompanied by unavoidable assumptions and caveats? Can a 
principled discussion be based on shaky grounds, as is here the case? 
F. Risk of Wrong Incentives and Other Considerations 
In the United States, judicial deference is sometimes said to 
create incentives for the legislature to vote vague legislation which is 
then interpreted and applied by agencies whose decisions are not fully 
reviewed by courts.196 This line of reasoning stems from the idea that 
agencies are more sympathetic to the legislature’s views than courts. 
This may be true when legislation is adopted, but the majority can 
change and, if agencies do not enjoy strong independence towards the 
head of state or government, they may be reluctant to apply certain 
rules enacted by previous parliamentary majorities. 
In any event, vague statutory provisions must be interpreted, the 
lead interpreter being, in this context, either agencies or courts, or a 
mix of both. Additionally, the legislature is usually entitled to enact 
 
194. Regarding the United States, see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 
U.S. 502, 547–48 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a convincing rejection of this 
approach, see DALY, supra note 16, at 113. Regarding Germany, see generally 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 30, 2019, 151 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202, 291, 293 (Ger.) 
(considering that the establishment of independent agencies must be specially justified 
and compensated by an effective judicial control). 
195. Regarding Germany and the U.S., see OSTER, supra note 5, at 152–53, 315. 
196. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Nathan Alexander Sales & 
Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and 
Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1543–48. 
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precise rules that minimize the scope of interpretation. Among these 
possibilities, it is at best unclear why the legislature would choose 
vague rules with more responsibility for the agencies to interpret them. 
In reality, members of a parliament often adopt vague legislation 
either because they cannot agree on more precise terms, they are not 
sure of the practical implications, or they would rather have agencies 
and courts perform this task.197 Strategic vagueness on the part of 
Parliament, in favor of agencies as opposed to courts, does not seem to 
be empirically founded.198 In any event, this peculiar objection against 
judicial deference does not derive from constitutional norms in the 
countries where it is raised. 
VI. THE ROOM FOR DEFERENCE 
Considering the foregoing, there may be room for judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation, within the 
applicable international, constitutional, statutory, and other limits 
(subpart A). An important, and perhaps the most convincing, 
justification for such a deference lies in the asymmetry of non-legal 
expertise (subpart B). Based on several criteria, the room for deference 
may be more precisely defined (subpart C). Finally, some specific 
comments will be made regarding Canada and the United States 
(subpart D). 
A. International, Constitutional, Statutory, and Other Limits 
As explained above,199 any judicial deference to administrative 
statutory interpretation has to comply with the applicable 
international, 200  constitutional, 201  and statutory limits. Other 
 
197. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Bednar & Hickman, supra 
note 49, at 1454–55. 
198. On judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
regulations in the United States, see, by analogy, Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 (2017). 
199. See supra Parts III.B, V.C–D. 
200. On the conformity of national law with European Union (EU) law for EU 
Member States, see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 161–65, 242–43. 
201. Regarding the German Basic Law (Article 19 Sect. 4 in particular), see, for 
example, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 31, 
2011, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE 1, 21–23 
(Ger.); Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 106; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 108-14; Schmidt-Aßmann, 
supra note 60, ¶¶ 180–85c. Regarding the Swiss Federal Constitution, see, for example, 
SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 339. Regarding the Constitution of the United States, see, 
for a fundamental critic of Chevron deference, Hamburger, supra note 57, at 1249–50 
(“The Constitution vests judicial power in the courts, and it staffs the courts with 
judges—that is, with persons who have an office of independent judgment. Judges, in 
adjudicating their cases, thus have the duty to exercise their own independent judgment 
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constraints may flow from general principles or notions such as the 
rule of law.202 Courts must ensure that administrative bodies remain 
within these limits or constraints.203 As described, limits are usually 
rather vague, and their precise meaning is determined through 
interpretation. Courts cannot avoid this step before determining 
whether to defer to administrative statutory interpretation and, if so, 
to what extent. 
The first set of limits relates to courts’ constitutional role. 
Constitutional provisions in this respect, especially as far as statute 
interpretation is concerned, are unclear in most countries. To a certain 
extent, the responsibility belongs to courts themselves to determine the 
exact outline of their role.204 Unless there are convincing supporting 
arguments, advice against overinterpreting very general constitutional 
norms may prove sound. There may, however, be historical, cultural, 
or constitutional differences between countries that justify a particular 
role of the judiciary. All things considered, one should expect that 
courts effectively adhere to the principles they infer from the 
constitution. Between a system of judicial review where courts consider 
that the constitution permits some limited deference and act 
accordingly, and a system where courts take the position that they are 
not allowed any deference, but unconsciously or consciously sometimes 
defer to administrative bodies, one may find the first more satisfactory, 
transparent, and constitutionally appealing. In this perspective, courts 
should state what they do205 and what they are actually able to do. 
The second set of limits comes from procedural safeguards and 
other rights guaranteed by international human rights, when 
applicable, as well as national constitutions.206 These limits have an 
important impact on the intensity of judicial review, but they do not 
necessarily exclude any type of deference.207 Courts should carefully 
verify whether and, if so, to what extent the applicable procedural 
safeguards allow them to defer to administrative statutory 
interpretation. These safeguards notably relate to the fairness of the 
 
about what the law is, including their own independent judgment about the 
interpretation of the law. Accordingly, when judges defer to agency judgments about 
statutory interpretation, the judges abandon their very office or duty as judges.”). 
202. Regarding Canada, see Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. 
Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 53−64 (2019). 
203. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Beaucamp, supra note 6, at 197. 
204. See supra Part V.C. 
205. See DALY, supra note 16, at 288. 
206. From a comparative perspective, see Lindseth, supra note 60, at 190. 
Regarding the German Basic Law, see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 51–52, 165–
66. 
207. See supra Part V.D. 
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decision-making process 208  and are usually of a constitutional or 
equivalent nature. Courts may also take into account the 
characteristics of the proceedings before the administrative body itself. 
When the latter acts impartially as well as independently and parties 
are largely involved and enjoy procedural safeguards in these 
proceedings, some judicial deference may be considered as admissible 
from a constitutional or a human rights standpoint.209 These elements 
may indeed contribute to considering that judicial proceedings, in case 
of an appeal against the administrative decision, remain fair even if 
there is some judicial deference. In Europe, compliance with the right 
to a fair trial based on Article 6 par. 1 ECHR is assessed on the basis 
of “the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal 
order.”210 
The third set of limits is composed of statutory provisions dealing 
with the relationship between administrative bodies and courts and, 
more precisely, with the standard of review which the latter must 
apply. Statutes regarding administrative procedure in particular may 
prevent courts from deferring to administrative decisions. Few clear-
 
208. Regarding Canada, see LEWANS, supra note 16, at 221. Regarding Germany, 
see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 749–50; Voßkuhle, supra note 65, at 
118. 
209. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance, 
Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 43800/12 para. 98 (2015). 
Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 49, 386. Regarding the United 
Kingdom and Australia, see Aronson, supra note 91, at 261 (“English and Australian 
courts go more lightly on court-like bodies because they are like courts, and because they 
are independent of government.”); see also Allan, supra note 106, at 45–53 (“The quality 
of the administrative process, insofar as it can be demonstrated, will enhance the court’s 
confidence that the ultimate outcome [where there is scope for reasonable differences of 
judgement] falls within the permitted range. For the court is inevitably dependent, in 
large part, on the inquiries and deliberation undertaken by the authority; and the closer 
the correspondence between the type of inquiry conducted by the authority and the style 
of analysis appropriate for courts, the more readily the court can be satisfied that all 
relevant considerations have been duly taken into account and properly weighed or 
assessed.” (quotation from page 47)). 
210. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance, Gil 
Sanjuan v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48297/15 para. 30 (May 26, 2020), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Sanjuan%20v.%20Spain"],"documentcollectio
nid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-202539"]} (last visi-ted Dec. 
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NDM3-R4A5] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Pasquini v. San 
Marino, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 50956/16 para. 89 (May 2, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Pasquini%20v.%20San%20Marino"],"docume
ntcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-192787"]} (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M2VB-XK7M] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Zubac v. 
Croatia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 40160/12 para. 82 (April 5, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Zubac%20v.%20Croatia"],"documentcollection
id2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-181821"]} [https://
perma.cc/3X7H-RFWX] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 (CRIMINAL LIMB), supra note 183, paras. 282, 303–04; 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 (CIVIL LIMB), supra note 183, 
paras. 57, 151, 275, 287, 292, 327, 359, 411. 
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cut provisions on this issue seem to exist in the many countries that 
have been considered in this Article.211 
In several countries, the applicable limits to judicial deference 
may actually lead to a nuanced approach. Administrative statutory 
interpretation of deep legal, political, or economic significance or of 
general questions of central importance to the legal system as a whole, 
may, for instance, be subject to judicial review without any deference. 
However, interpretation with a more constrained impact may not, 
provided that neither the applicable standard of review nor procedural 
safeguards impose an unrestrained judicial review. 
B. Asymmetry of Non-Legal Expertise 
The case for or against judicial deference to administrative 
statutory interpretation raises many issues. When the applicable 
international, constitutional, statutory, and other limits leave some 
room to such deference, the asymmetry of non-legal expertise can be 
regarded as an important or, depending on the country, even decisive 
element. 212  It may actually have substantive and procedural 
 
211. Regarding the “unclearness” of Section 706 of the US Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1642–44. 
212. From a comparative or general perspective, see, for example, Zhu, supra 
note 16, at 11–12; Reitz, supra note 3, at 298 (“. . . de facto deference may well be 
universal, especially deference on the grounds of governmental expertise.”); JORDÃO, 
supra note 16, at 152–53, 305–06, 568; DALY, supra note 16, at 72–89; Tolley, supra 
note 84, at 437–38; see also Allan, supra note 106, at 43 (“When there is scope for 
different answers or approaches, it is right that the court accept the solution favoured 
by the public authority. Not only may the authority possess an expertise that the court 
itself lacks, but it will normally be publicly accountable in ways that judges are not.”). 
Regarding Australia, in a prospective way, see Boughey, supra note 43, at 36–37, 45–47, 
53; Regarding Canada, see Frank A. V. Falzon, Statutory Interpretation, Deference and 
the Ambiguous Concept of “Ambiguity” on Judicial Review, 29 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 
135, 142 (2016). Regarding China, see Gao, supra note 145, at 125–29. Regarding France, 
in a prospective way, see Autin, supra note 155, at 294. Regarding Germany, see, for 
example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1294; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 47-50; Hoffmann-Riem, 
supra note 4, at 743–45; see also Christoph Möllers, Materiellrechtliche Bindungen 
unabhängiger Regulierungsbehörden [Substantive Norms Binding Regulation 
Authorities], in INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES, supra note 2, at 231, 257–58 
(insisting on the complexity of fact processing and time pressure that courts face). 
Regarding Japan, even though deference does not relate to interpretation of statutes as 
such, see Kawagishi, supra note 35, at 317–19. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, 
supra note 6, at 338–39, 341–62. Regarding Taiwan, see Cheng-Yi Huang, Judicial 
Deference to Agency’s Discretion in New Democracies: Observations on Constitutional 
Decisions in Poland, Taiwan, and South Africa, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
supra note 14, at 478, 482–85. Regarding the United States, see, for example, ESKRIDGE, 
supra note 99, at 282–83; Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1396; Eskridge & Baer, supra 
note 78, at 1173–74. 
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dimensions,213 and is comparative in its nature.214 Many other aspects 
of the debate are linked to it or are rather inconclusive. 
In Canada, “asymmetry and specialization” are mentioned by the 
Supreme Court to justify judicial deference regarding administrative 
decisions, though the Court does not systematically focus on non-legal 
expertise and considers that even decisions balancing constitutional 
values may be subject to such deference.215 The Supreme Court also 
mentions “the different roles of the courts and administrative bodies 
within the Canadian constitutional system.” 216  More precisely, a 
question of law, which was not of central importance to the legal 
system, could nonetheless be compatible with a reasonableness 
standard where there was a privative clause (i.e., “a statutory direction 
from Parliament or a legislature indicating the need for deference”), or 
in the case of a “discrete and special administrative regime in which 
the decision maker has special expertise.”217  According to a recent 
landmark decision, the Supreme Court now presumes that 
“reasonableness is the applicable standard in all cases,” and 
“[r]eviewing courts should derogate from this presumption only where 
required by a clear indication of legislative intent or by the rule of 
law.”218 While the relative expertise of administrative decision-makers 
“is no longer relevant to a determination of the standard of review,”219 
it “remains a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness 
review.” 220  This relates, inter alia, to the interpretation by an 
 
213. Regarding the United States, see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due 
Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893, 1915–16, 1919–21, 1931 (2016) (“Under resource 
constraints, agencies must design procedures with a view to substance, and vice versa. 
Hence procedure and substance, whether or not conceptually distinct, are pragmatically 
inextricable, and agencies must calibrate both margins simultaneously. Agency 
authority over substance, explicitly or implicitly delegated by Congress and justified by 
agency expertise, necessarily implies authority over procedure as well.” (quotation from 
page 1931)). 
214. Regarding the United States, see VERMEULE, supra note 41, at 156. 
215. Doré v. Barreau du Québec [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, para. 47 (Can.); see also 
Loyola High School v. Québec (Attorney General) [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, paras. 4, 35–42. 
On this case law, see, for example, Daly, Deference on Questions of Law, supra note 14, 
at 707 (“The best answer to a question of law might come from a delegated decision-
maker more familiar than a court with the particular area of law.”); LEWANS, supra 
note 16, at 181–82. For a nuanced and somehow dubitative view in this respect, see 
Aronson, supra note 91, at 247–48, 261. 
216. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 55 (Can.). 
217. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47; see also Smith v. Alliance Pipeline 
Ltd. [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160, paras. 26–40 (Can.). On this case law, see, for example, Paul 
Daly, Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on 
Standard of Review and Reasonableness, 62 MCGILL L.J. 527, 532, 540 (2016) 
[hereinafter Daly, Struggling Towards Coherence]; Craig, supra note 11, at 399–400, 
402–03 (agreeing with this approach). 
218. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, 
para. 10 (Can.). 
219. Id. para. 31. 
220. Id. paras. 31, 93. 
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administrative body of the statute it administers, except when 
“constitutional questions, general questions of law of central 
importance to the legal system as a whole and questions related to the 
jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies” 
are at stake.221 Furthermore, the asymmetry of expertise may also 
play a role even when correctness is the applicable standard of review, 
as mixed questions of law and fact are subject to a deferential 
standard.222 Finally, expertise and institutional experience may be a 
reason “for the legislature to delegate the administration of a statutory 
scheme to a particular administrative decision maker.” 223  In this 
regard, putting responsibility and accountability on the legislature 
appears quite sound in a democratic system. 
In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has rendered relevant 
decisions according deference with regard to tribunals.224 According to 
the relevant case law, there are limits to substitution of judgment with 
regard to questions of law in cases where decisions of a tribunal are 
challenged before a court.225 There is not yet a definitive case as to 
whether the same reasoning might apply in other contexts, for instance 
in the case of an agency with expertise in its particular assigned field. 
It is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom would extend its reasoning to such a situation, or whether it 
would confine it to the sphere of tribunals. Arguments could weigh in 
favor of either side, and a nuanced approach may be appropriate.226 
Considering especially agencies’ special expertise, prominent scholars 
favor extension of the reasoning outside this sphere.227  
 
221. Id. paras. 17, 53, 119 (“The specialized expertise and experience of 
administrative decision makers may sometimes lead them to rely, in interpreting a 
provision, on considerations that a court would not have thought to employ but that 
actually enrich and elevate the interpretive exercise.”). The second and third categories 
of questions are especially relevant with respect to the interpretation of statutes. 
222. See Paul Daly, The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian 
Administrative Law, 33 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 111, 121 (2020) (“It is, nonetheless, 
difficult to be categorical about the likely consequences of Vavilov for economic 
regulation and professional discipline, where the expertise of decision-makers is well-
established as a matter of social fact even if it is henceforth irrelevant as a matter of 
legal doctrine. Much will depend, therefore, on the willingness of first-instance judges to 
categorize matters coming within the expertise of regulators as questions of law [subject 
to correctness review] or as mixed questions [subject to review for palpable and 
overriding error] . . . . And one wonders whether, despite the injunction to perform 
correctness review on extricable questions of law, courts hearing appeals from 
specialized administrative decision-makers will nevertheless give significant or perhaps 
even dispositive weight to the decision-makers’ views on matters within their expertise. 
Deference might not be dead yet.”(footnote omitted)). 
223. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 29. 
224. See, e.g., R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; R (Jones) v. First Tier 
Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19. 
225. See R (Cart), [2011] UKSC at [43]; R (Jones), [2013] UKSC at [44]. 
226. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 91, at 253. 
227. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 14, at 391–94, 402–03. 
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In the European Union, the specific expertise of the European 
Commission—specifically of the Directorate-General (DG) for 
Competition—may lead to some judicial deference in complex economic 
appraisals relevant for the interpretation of competition law norms, 
though it is now considered that said appraisals are subject to full 
judicial review.228 
The asymmetry of expertise between administrative bodies and 
courts may first and foremost play a role when the interpretation of 
statutory provisions requires technical, economic, or scientific 
expertise in particular. The term “non-legal expertise” may seem 
counterintuitive or even inapt in this context, as expertise usually 
refers to facts rather than law. However, the point is made here that 
technical expertise, for instance, may be useful or even required to 
interpret some statutory provisions. 229  In the United States, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that the relevant experience and 
expertise may extend to the interpretation of complex statutory 
schemes of regulation. 230  For instance, the term “dangerous 
substances” used in a statute needs to be interpreted. This task very 
likely requires having deep theoretical and empirical knowledge of 
chemistry, biology, and other scientific fields, as well as of the various 
factual situations in which the application of the provision in question 
can be considered. The distinction between law and fact definitely 
comprises a grey zone,231 not least because some issues raise mixed 
questions of law and fact.232 Indeed, the prohibition on “dangerous 
 
228. See Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 509–11, 531–33, 537–38 (noting the 
evolution in the case law of the European Court of Justice and concluding, on page 538, 
with these words: “Whether there is a need to adapt the procedural framework or 
practice to the new challenge of ensuring full judicial review in the light of an increased 
use of complex economic methodologies is a matter of debate. In some cases, courts may 
want to make broader use of court-appointed experts in the future. Yet, the greatest 
difficulty may not lie in understanding economic theories typically presented in some 
clarity by the parties, but in aptly translating them into law. This is a genuinely legal 
task.” (footnotes omitted)). 
229. Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1626–29, 1673 
(distinguishing between “purely legal expertise” and “technical expertise”); TUSHNET, 
supra note 122, at 159 (“Whatever the case for Chevron itself, it does seem true that for 
highly technical judgments, agency expertise is often helpful in figuring out the best 
interpretation of a statute.”). 
230. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–28, 235 (2001); Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222, 225 (2002). 
231. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 14, at 705. 
232. Regarding Canada, see, for example, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 37 (Can.). Regarding the United States, 
see, for example, The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in 
Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the  H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 41 (2016) 
(prepared statement of John F. Duffy, Professor of Law, University of Va. L. Sch.) 
(“Congress might also consider recognizing the traditional view that, in formal agency 
adjudicatory proceedings, some issues decided by the agency are not pure issues of 
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substances” raises countless factual issues, but the relevant 
administrative body must also determine criteria to evaluate a 
substance’s danger and set limits beyond which a prohibition is 
justified.233 In other words, it must not only determine whether some 
substances are dangerous, but also—at least to a certain extent—
define what “dangerous” means. By doing so, it interprets or constructs 
the relevant statute. The same can be said of the term “relevant 
market” widely used in competition law. What is a market? What does 
relevancy mean? Criteria based on economic theories and data analysis 
must be defined in order to answer these questions and interpret these 
terms.234 
Of course, the difference between legal and non-legal expertise is 
vague. Judges should determine at what moment they get out of their 
actual and—from the legislature—reasonably expected zone of 
expertise. When they act accordingly in an honest, reasoned, and 
transparent manner and comply with the applicable international, 
constitutional, statutory, and other constraints, they are up to their 
judicial task 235  and create valuable case law. The test cannot be 
subjective, as it would produce personal and unpredictable results; 
judicial deference should not depend on each judge. Accordingly, judges 
must, to a certain extent at least, carefully objectivize and 
institutionalize the notion of asymmetry of expertise and, hence, the 
concept of judicial deference. 236  In Germany, for example, certain 
administrative decisions are complex and based on ongoing 
developments, where courts reach their functional limitations;237  a 
licensing procedure for a nuclear power plant provides a good 
illustration here.238 
 
statutory interpretation but are instead mixed questions of law and fact. For such 
questions, a reviewing court might provide deference to the agency not because of the 
agency’s abilities at statutory interpretation, but because of the agency’s superior ability 
to apply a statutory concept to the specific factual context in that adjudication.”). 
233. For similar examples, see Bednar & Hickman, supra note 49, at 1448. 
234. See Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson, The Relevant Market in Competition Law: A 
Legal Concept, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 158 (2019). In the European Union, see 
the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purpose of 
Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372/5) (this notice has been subject to a 
public consultation in 2020 and may be updated in 2021). 
235. Regarding the UK, see Rebecca Williams, When is an Error Not an Error? 
Reform of Jurisdictional Review of Error of Law and Fact, 2007 PUB. L. 793, 799. 
236. From a comparative perspective, see JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 541–42; see 
also DALY, supra note 16, at 86; Tan, supra note 179, at 400 (“Any claims of specialised 
knowledge or expertise must be rigorously tested.”). Regarding Canada, see Edmonton 
(City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs. Ltd., [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293, para. 33 
(Can.). 
237. See, e.g., Oster, supra note 4, at 1275, 1294. 
238. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG][Federal Constitutional Court] July 8, 
1982, 61 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 82, 110–16 
(Ger.). 
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The asymmetry of non-legal expertise is especially of importance 
when the interpretation of statutory provisions explicitly or implicitly 
requires making some predictions in uncertain situations or specific 
appraisals or assessments.239 Interpretation of the words “dangerous,” 
“feasible,” “reasonable,” or “apt” may illustrate this point, notably in 
the United States, especially when they are used in a context that 
requires such expertise.240 There is a difference between the statutory 
ban of “violent video games” for minors and the one of “video games 
likely to cause violent behaviors” in countries where the constitution 
allows such prohibitions. Ceteris paribus, judicial deference may be 
admissible solely or particularly for the interpretation of the second 
type of prohibition. 
The initial asymmetry of non-legal expertise does not mean that 
courts do not carry any responsibility to correct it, partially or 
completely depending on the case.241 Courts should in principle not 
presume it242—Canada may partly be a special case here243—and can 
 
239. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1272 
(“Indefinite legal terms [unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe] are terms that require a valuation. 
Mostly there is no assured scientific knowledge to conclude if a certain statutory 
requirement is met or not . . . . Strictly speaking, these are not legal terms, but terms 
from natural, economic or other sciences used in a statute.”). Regarding the United 
States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1628 (raising the following hypotheses: “If . . . 
ambiguities cannot be resolved without the application of technical expertise, the 
pragmatic argument for Chevron would be more forceful. So too if resolution of 
ambiguities would not be possible without resort to judgments of value that are best 
made by a politically accountable entity.” (footnote omitted)); see also, from a broader 
perspective, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1174 (“Typically, agencies are much 
better equipped to handle issues of uncertainty than courts are.”). 
240. Regarding the United States, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical 
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 893 (2020) (referring, with respect to judicial 
deference, to “cases in which there is no surface upon which traditional lawyers’ tools 
can have purchase, such as commands that the agency be ‘reasonable’ or act ‘in the public 
interest’ when those phrases are not terms of art”); Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2153; 
Bednar & Hickman, supra note 49, at 1448–49. 
241. Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supra note 30, para. 130. 
242. Regarding Canada, see Joseph T. Robertson, Administrative Deference: The 
Canadian Doctrine that Continues to Disappoint 68 (Apr. 18, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165083 [https:
//perma.cc/R7XH-F6XU] (archived Sept. 27, 2020). Regarding Germany, see Klaus 
Schönenbroicher, § 40, in VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ [ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT] para. 94 (Thomas Mann, Christoph Sennekamp & Michael Uechtritz 
eds., 2d ed. 2019). Regarding the United Kingdom, see Allan, supra note 106, at 51; 
Aileen Kavanagh, Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory, 126 
L.Q. REV. 222, 226 (2010) (“[T]he question about relative competence, expertise and 
legitimacy must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the contextual 
factors relevant to the deference inquiry.”). 
243. See Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs. Ltd., [2016] 
2 S.C.R. 293, para. 33 (Can.) (“[A]s with judges, expertise is not a matter of the 
qualifications or experience of any particular tribunal member. Rather, expertise is 
something that inheres in a tribunal itself as an institution. . . .”). But see, in this case, 
the joint dissenting opinion. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs., [2016] 2 S.C.R. 
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appoint experts where and when they are validly required to do so or 
deem it necessary. Nevertheless, the systematic appointment of 
experts to deal with the subject matter of all challenged administrative 
statutory interpretations is neither realistic nor appropriate from a 
cost, efficiency, or even justice perspective. 244  In a challenge to a 
statute’s interpretation, should an expert really be appointed if no clear 
and potentially decisive argument is brought?245 The asymmetry of 
non-legal expertise must ultimately be assessed after taking into 
account the reasonable and realistic possibility of appointing experts 
in the relevant fields.246 
The mere asymmetry of non-legal expertise does not necessarily 
mean that administrative statutory interpretation should, in most 
cases, benefit from judicial deference. Such a general approach would 
most likely not fit within the constitutional247 and legal framework of 
many countries. To be constitutionally admissible, judicial deference 
has to be framed by criteria and assessed in the relevant context. 
C. Conceivable Criteria for Deference 
Several criteria, needed to admit judicial deference to 
administrative statutory interpretation, are conceivable. They differ 
depending on whether the legislature has explicitly or actively (1) or 
only implicitly or passively (2) enabled courts to exercise such 
deference. 
1. Explicitly or Actively Enabling Judicial Deference 
Judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation may 
explicitly be imposed or permitted by statute. In such a case, courts 
 
293,  para. 85 (Côté and Brown, JJ., dissenting) (“Courts must not infer from the mere 
creation of an administrative tribunal that it necessarily possesses greater relative 
expertise in all matters it decides, especially on questions of law.”). In the recent Vavilov 
decision, the Supreme Court seems to insist on “demonstrated experience and expertise.” 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 93 
(Can.). Regarding the presumption of deference in Canada, see supra Part III.C. 
244. See JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 214–15. 
245. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 73–74, 385–86, who 
provides an answer to this question in the negative. 
246. Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supra note 30, ¶¶ 130–31. 
247. Regarding Germany, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal 
Constitutional Court] May 31, 2011, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 22–23 (Ger.); Aschke, supra note 30, 
¶ 130; see also Markus Ludwigs, Verfassung im Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrecht: 
Bedeutungsverlust durch Europäisierung und Emanzipation? [Constitution in General 
Administrative Law: Loss of Significance Due to Europeanization and Emancipation?], 
2015 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NEW J. FOR ADMIN. L.] 1327, 1329 
and Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 60, ¶ 191, who both refer to Article 19, § 4 of the 
German Basic Law (access to courts). 
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still have to verify that the relevant statute does not violate the 
constitution or international law in countries where the supremacy of 
the one or the other over statutes is legally enforceable. A general 
authorization of judicial deference, granted by the legislature, may 
prove unconstitutional or contrary to general principles such as the 
rule of law in many countries; accordingly, the legislature would have 
to consider the situations in which judicial deference specifically makes 
sense and is authorized or enabled. However, an explicit and specific 
authorization does not mean that courts do not face difficult questions. 
Firstly, when courts are expressly allowed but are under no 
obligation to defer to administrative statutory interpretation, they 
must define criteria under which they will use this option.248  The 
statutory provision must, therefore, be interpreted with the applicable 
methods and canons of construction. If this does not lead to clear 
results, courts may then refer to the criteria below relating to 
situations where the legislature has implicitly, or even passively, 
enabled judicial deference.249 
Secondly, the precise intensity of deference is most likely not 
defined in the relevant statute. Courts themselves must address this 
issue.250 There may be a gradation in intensity depending on the types 
of cases subject to judicial review. The highest level of intensity of 
deference could occur when the criteria below are cumulatively met.251 
Speaking of “explicitly or actively enabling judicial deference” 
rather than only of “explicitly enabling judicial deference” is preferred 
in this Article. The two adverbs should largely be considered as 
synonymous, but not completely. There may be situations where the 
interpretation of a statute according to the applicable methods and 
canons of construction clearly and unequivocally leads to the 
conclusion that the legislature specifically addressed the issue of 
judicial deference and wanted courts to defer to administrative 
statutory interpretation, though no explicit wording was formulated in 
the relevant statute.252 In such a situation, one may consider that the 
authorization was active, though not explicit. In some countries, a 
statute can contain a so-called “qualified silence” which has normative 
value.253 In others, a textual interpretation of statute precludes or 
limits such an approach. 
 
248. See, e.g., Kavanagh, supra note 242, at 223. 
249. See infra Part VI.C.2. 
250. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 383. 
251. See infra Part VI.C.2. 
252. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 121. 
253. Regarding Switzerland, see, for instance, Bundesgericht [BGer] Oct. 18, 2011, 
138 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 1, 4 (Ger.); 
MOOR, FLÜCKIGER & MARTENET, supra note 29, at 150. 
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2. Implicitly or Passively Enabling Judicial Deference 
From a comparative perspective, there are very few examples of 
active authorization for courts to defer to administrative statutory 
interpretation. In most countries considered in this Article, the 
authorization or, better, the enablement is regarded, at best, as 
implicit or passive, depending on the country or the circumstances. 
This supposes that the applicable international, constitutional, 
statutory, and other constraints leave room for such deference. 
The three initial steps of judicial analysis consist of determining 
whether a statute allows a margin of interpretation or construction in 
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction,254 verifying 
that the administrative statutory interpretation remains within this 
margin, and carefully interpreting and respecting the applicable 
international, constitutional, statutory, and other constraints framing 
the potential for deference, generally or in the individual case.255 The 
distinction between clarity and ambiguity of a statute is itself blurry 
and subject to different opinions and interpretations,256 and courts 
should really strive to find the meaning of a statute.257 Nevertheless, 
there may be situations where, despite judges’ best efforts and good 
will, a statutory provision really allows a margin of interpretation in 
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction,258 (i.e., in 
light of the various interpretive principles and not only the textual 
ones).259 One could argue that the first step is unnecessary and that 
courts should directly assess whether the administrative 
interpretation remains compatible with the applicable methods and 
canons of construction. Interpretation of the law is, however, a 
fundamental judicial task, and courts bear a responsibility in this 
respect. Hence, deference should not be the starting point—the 
applicable legal regime may, however, be special in a given country—
 
254. On this issue, see, for example, Scalia, supra note 153, at 517, 520–21. 
255. On this issue, see JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 567–70. 
256. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Richard M. Re, Clarity 
Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497, 1505–21 (2019). With respect to Chevron, see id. at 
1531–40. 
257. Regarding the United States, see especially Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 
2134–56; see also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1672-73. In a recent decision relating to the 
interpretation of an agency’s regulations, but quoting the Chevron decision, the Supreme 
Court made clear that “before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court 
must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 
2415 (2019) (citation omitted). 
258. From a comparative perspective, see Daly, Deference on Questions of Law, 
supra note 14, at 700–01. Regarding Canada, see Falzon, supra note 212, at 145–49. 
Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1673 (“[S]ome ambiguities 
are real and others are merely apparent. They disappear on reflection.”). 
259. Regarding Canada, see Robertson, supra note 242, at 67. 
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and the sole focus should not lie on the administrative body’s 
interpretive task. 
There should be, in principle, no judicial deference with respect to 
these three steps,260 which also ensure that administrative bodies are 
ultimately bound to the same methods and canons of construction261 
and that their interpretation of a statute is neither unreasonable nor 
arbitrary.262 There may be strong arguments against the idea that 
administrative bodies, in which lawyers do not necessarily have the 
final say, should apply the same methods and canons of construction 
as courts.263 In difficult cases, where appeals come almost certainly, 
they have to convince judges264  and must, at least, follow judicial 
precedent and remain sensitive to judicial methods of interpreting 
laws. 265  It does not make them “master[ies] of the principles of 
 
260. Regarding the first step in the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 
1679 (“[I]t is both correct and important to insist that it is for judges, not agencies, to 
decide whether statutes contain ambiguities, and whether they delegate law-
interpreting power.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW & 
LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 136, 138 (2020). 
261. On this point, see, regarding Australia, Cane, supra note 91, at 238 (“[B]oth 
normatively and strategically, administrators should approach interpretation in 
precisely the way a court would, applying the same rules, principles and modes of 
reasoning.” (footnote omitted)); regarding Canada, Canada (Minister of Citizenship & 
Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 120 (Can.) (“But whatever form the 
interpretive exercise takes, the merits of an administrative decision maker’s 
interpretation of a statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and 
purpose of the provision. In this sense, the usual principles of statutory interpretation 
apply equally when an administrative decision maker interprets a provision.”). See also 
Paul Daly, The Struggle for Deference in Canada, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 84, at 297, 322 (“Administrative decision-makers are 
taught by reviewing courts that it is better to think like lawyers, even if the legislature’s 
goal of empowering administrative decision-makers in the first place was to avoid having 
decisions made by people who think like lawyers.” (footnote omitted)). 
262. On this last point, see OSTER, supra note 5, at 313; Sunstein, supra note 60, 
at 1673, 1678. 
263. Regarding Canada, see Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra 
note 28, at 257–58, 264–66 (considering that “[a]n applicant for judicial review must first 
identify indicia of unreasonableness that afflict a decision” such as “[i]llogicality, 
inconsistency with statutory purpose or underlying values, differential treatment and 
unexplained changes in policy”). Are these elements not some of the ones that are covered 
by the applicable methods and canons of construction in many jurisdictions? On the 
interpretation with the help of logical arguments, see, from a combined (Austrian, 
German & Swiss) perspective, ERNST A. KRAMER, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE [LEGAL 
METHODOLOGY] 183–84, 194–96 (6th ed. 2019); see also, from an Austrian perspective, 
FRANZ BYDLINSKI & PETER BYDLINSKI, GRUNDZÜGE DER JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE 
[FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY] 52–55 (3rd ed. 2018). 
264. Regarding Canada and the United States, see Paul Daly, Doubts About 
Deference: Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 32 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & 
PRAC. 137, 147 (2019). 
265. Regarding English and Australian law, see CANE, supra note 172, at 236–38. 
Regarding the United Kingdom, see CRAIES ON LEGISLATION: A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 
TO THE NATURE, PROCESS, EFFECT AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 737–38 (Daniel 
Greenberg ed., 11th ed. 2017).  
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technical textualism,”266 as various methods—not just this last one—
and canons of construction may come into play.267 True, it is possible 
that no consensus exists among judges on the applicable methods and 
canons of construction or the way to ponder them.268 Each judge should 
nevertheless interpret a statute by using the methods and canons she 
allowably considers appropriate and, if no clear conclusion comes out 
of this process, verify that the administrative interpretation of the 
relevant statute remains compatible with the same methods and 
canons. 
The obligation to remain within the margin of interpretation269—
or, in other words, within the “construction zone”270—determined in 
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction, does not 
mean that the administrative body has made the best use of these 
methods and canons, 271  but that its statute interpretation is 
compatible with them or, in other words, remains admissible or 
defensible in light of them. These criteria represent a way to partly 
formalize the “reasonableness test” applied in several jurisdictions.272 
Incidentally, on the basis of these canons, the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
266. Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra note 28, at 266. 
267. Regarding Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, see, for example, WANK, 
supra note 30, at 41–75; KRAMER, supra note 263, at 63–203; BYDLINSKI & BYDLINSKI, 
supra note 263, at 27–79; regarding the United Kingdom and, more generally, common 
law countries, see, for example, DIGGORY BAILEY & LUKE NORBURY, BENNION ON 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 283–327 (7th ed. 2017). 
268. See, e.g., JORDÃO, supra note 16, at 250–51, 370–72. Regarding the United 
States, see Bednar & Hickman, supra note 49, at 145–53. 
269. Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 133. 
270. See Solum & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 1470, 1472, 1475, 1482, 1487; see 
also Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step 
as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 189–95 (2010). 
271. Regarding the United States, see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and 
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2398–400, 2403 (2020) (Kagan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
272. Regarding the United Kingdom, see Williams, supra note 235, at 800–01, 804, 
808 (emphasis omitted) (distinguishing “between true jurisdictional error, where the 
decision-maker fails to reach an objectively verifiable standard and the court can 
intervene automatically to correct this by substituting the correct answer, and excess of 
jurisdictional discretion, where the definition and application of a jurisdictional 
condition such as ‘illegal entrant’ contains a degree of discretion and the court can only 
exercise rationality review in accordance with the normal principles, taking account of 
relative institutional competence along with other advantages and disadvantages of 
intervention.” (quotation from page 808)). On this issue, see also Daly, Struggling 
Towards Coherence?, supra note 217, at 557 (“Badges of unreasonableness must be 
identified in order to justify striking down a decision . . . Notably, the indicia of 
unreasonableness can be drawn from the same sources as the contextual factors that 
make up the range of reasonable outcomes: inconsistent decisions, for instance, sound in 
the rule of law; whereas decisions that fail to take into account important statutory 
language do violence to the democratic principle. And, in general, ensuring that decisions 
respect the fundamental precepts of the legal system is a means of upholding the rule of 
law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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might have reached the same conclusion in the Chevron case as it did, 
without needing to develop a specific doctrine of deference.273 
Should a special and separate “reasonable and not arbitrary test” 
be additionally conducted if it is not foreseen by the applicable law or 
case law? Unreasonable or arbitrary statutory interpretation will most 
certainly conflict with the methods and canons of construction—
reasonableness includes, from this perspective, compliance with 
principles of statutory interpretation 274 —or the applicable 
international, constitutional, and statutory constraints. Depending on 
the jurisdiction, canons of construction, constitutional, and other 
constraints may anyway single out the same issue. For instance, the 
absence of deference when statute interpretation raises questions of 
deep social, economic, and political significance275 may be regarded as 
a canon of construction276 or a constitutional constraint. The same can 
be said of the obligation to interpret a statute so as to stay away from 
the terrain of constitutional doubt.277 
Courts must then determine whether the legislature has 
implicitly or passively enabled them to defer to administrative 
interpretation of statutes.278 There should be no judicial deference to 
administrative decisions with regard to this issue.279 The asymmetry 
of non-legal expertise between administrative bodies and courts may 
play an important role in the eyes of the legislature but is not 
 
273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 73–
75 (2019). 
274. Regarding Canada, see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. 
Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 115–24 (Can.). 
275. Regarding the United States, see King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484–87 
(2015). 
276. Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1675–77. 
277. On the “Avoidance Canon” in the United States in this context, see Gluck & 
Posner, supra note 3, at 1331–32 (“Thirteen judges . . . singled out lenity and/or 
constitutional avoidance as ‘actual rules’ and distinguished them from the other canons, 
in terms of their mandatory application. They told us that these presumptions are ‘not 
canons’ but rather are ‘substantive law.’”); see also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1675. 
From a general perspective, see Allan, supra note 101, at 55 (“When a statute confers 
discretion on a public agency . . . the limits of that discretion should be construed 
consistently with legal principles and individual rights, allowing only such minimal 
encroachment on these principles and rights as is demonstrably necessary to the 
fulfilment of a legitimate public purpose.”). On the constitutionally compliant 
interpretation of statutes (“verfassungskonforme Auslegung”) in Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland, which is widely considered as a constitutional constraint, see, for example, 
WANK, supra note 30, at 59–64; KRAMER, supra note 263, at 116–19; BYDLINSKI & 
BYDLINSKI, supra note 263, at 55, 58. 
278. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 746. 
Regarding the United States, see, for example, TUSHNET, supra note 122, at 160. 
279. Regarding Germany, see Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 60, ¶ 187; see also 
Voßkuhle, supra note 65, at 118. Regarding the United States, see SUNSTEIN & 
VERMEULE, supra note 260, at 138 (“[I]t is for judges, not agencies, to decide whether 
statutes delegate law-interpreting power to administrators, whether statutes contain 
ambiguities, and whether agencies’ resolutions of those ambiguities are reasonable.”). 
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automatically sufficient. The expertise in question must be relevant to 
the disputed interpretation of the statute, especially when a prediction, 
an appraisal, or an assessment must be made,280 and the legislature 
was or should have been aware of both the asymmetry and the 
necessity.281 For instance, the word “carcinogenic” may allow a margin 
of interpretation (when and at what level can a substance or a product 
be qualified as such?) and its interpretation may require non-legal 
expertise as well as the making of predictions. A broad and open-ended 
word used in a statute such as “reasonable” or “appropriate” can, but 
should not necessarily be considered as ambiguous or unclear. In the 
context of the statute in its entirety and on the basis of the applicable 
methods and canons of construction, the distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable may indeed be clear. In such a case, 
judicial review can be exercised without any particular deference.282 
In Switzerland, judicial deference to administrative 
interpretation of statutes especially relates to situations where local 
circumstances matter, 283  technical questions are raised, 284  or the 
orientation of public policies is at stake.285 In Germany, there are three 
main forms of judicial deference to administrative decisions or other 
acts, which originate from the administration’s discretion (Ermessen 
der Verwaltung), freedom of planning (planerische 
Gestaltungsfreiheit), and latitude of judgment 
(Beurteilungsspielraum). 286  These three types of deference may 
overlap and relate to statute interpretation and application.287 The 
first two are instances where the administration has some discretion 
to choose between consequences once the legal requirements of a 
statute are met. They are normal features of German administrative 
 
280. Regarding Canada, see DALY, supra note 16, at 73 (“In particular areas, 
expertise may be indispensable. Risk regulation is a good example. A number of key 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada highlight the relevance of expertise to deciding 
the appropriate degree of curial deference to accord to a delegated decision-maker.” 
(footnote omitted)). Regarding Germany, see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 191, 
313–14; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744–45. Regarding the United States, see, for 
example, Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2153 (“[C]ourts should still defer to agencies in 
cases involving statutes using broad and open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ 
‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’”). 
281. On this issue, see DALY, supra note 16, at 77–79. Regarding Germany, see 
Eifert, supra note 9, at 339. 
282. On this issue, see Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2153–54. 
283. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Court] June 28, 2000, 126 ARRÊTS DU 
TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] I 219, 222 (Switz.).  
284. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Court] Dec. 10, 2010, 137 ARRÊTS DU 
TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] II 152, 162 (Switz.). 
285. See e.g., Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Court] Aug. 31, 2006, 132 ARRÊTS DU 
TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] II 408, 416–27 (Switz.). 
286. See, e.g., OSTER, supra note 5, at 29–68; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 5–114. 
287. See, e.g., OSTER, supra note 5, at 67. Regarding Switzerland, see, by analogy, 
TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 220–23. 
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law. The last one especially concerns indefinite legal terms used in 
statutes that the legislature has—explicitly or implicitly 288 —duly 
authorized the administration to interpret with some latitude 
(Spielraum).289 Reviewing case law and legal literature on this issue, 
one can note that cases in which judicial deference to administrative 
statutory interpretation or application is admitted relate mostly to 
legal norms requiring specific non-legal expertise or the making of 
predictions, appraisals or assessments; more concretely, the 
established cases concern professional assessments of public servants, 
exam situations, complex prognoses, decisions by independent expert 
panels, and by pluralistically composed panels, such as film 
classification boards.290 The topic is not as controversial in Germany 
as in the United States, notably because the instances where deference 
occurs are rather minor. Moreover, most of the cases arise between 
courts and the hierarchical administration. In other words, judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation and independent 
agencies are not connected issues in Germany. 
Under the conditions mentioned in this subpart, 291  judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation can be seen as 
acceptable, and even legitimate, in countries where there is room for 
such deference. Thus, while there may be other specific situations, in 
some of these countries where such deference could be justified, one 
may conclude that there is a case for judicial deference, at least when 
these various conditions are cumulatively met. 
 
 
288. See Aschke, supra note 30, ¶¶ 105–06; Schönenbroicher, supra note 242, ¶ 99; 
Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, § 114, in VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG [ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDICIAL CODE] ¶¶ 295–96 (Helge Sodan & Jan Ziekow eds., 5th ed. 2018). 
289. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG][Federal Constitutional Court] May 
31, 2011, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 21–
23 (Ger.). 
290. See, e.g., Aschke, supra note 30, ¶¶ 107–26.4; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 48–
50, 63–107, 119–22, 381–88; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744–45; Schmidt-
Aßmann, supra note 60, ¶¶ 188–217a; Eifert, supra note 9, at 339–41. Regarding exams, 
see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 17, 1991, 84 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 34, 52–58 (Ger.). 
291. For criteria that are partly close to this approach, see, regarding the United 
States, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1180 (proposing to consider whether the 
agency interpretation is “consistent with larger public norms, including constitutional 
values”; whether it is made “pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking 
authority”; and whether the agency is “applying special expertise to a technical issue, 
seriously applying its understanding of the facts to carry out congressional purposes”). 
The authors conclude that “[w]here an agency has applied its expertise to an issue as to 
which judges are substantively much less competent, judges should and do take a 
deferential attitude, subject to rule-of-law limits such as textual plain meanings, 
legislative compromises, and precedent.” Id., at 1202. From a comparative perspective, 
see Craig, supra note 14, at 402–03. 
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D. Specific Comments Regarding Canada and the United States 
This comparative study suggests that the supreme courts of 
Canada and the United States have gone quite far in terms of judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes.292 The study, to 
a certain extent, supports the doctrines developed in these two 
countries but also invites reflection regarding their scope. 
Firstly, a presumption of deference somehow exists in Canada,293 
even though its scope is significantly reduced, and the case law is not 
always straightforward. In the United States, the Chevron doctrine, 
even with its subsequent limitations, is rather far reaching as it makes 
a link between statutory ambiguity and “delegation” of some 
interpretive authority to agencies.294 To be fair, the US doctrine of 
judicial review is quite strict. Moreover, the reviewing court has to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation only if the statutory law is 
interpreted as delegating interpretive authority to the agency and if 
the interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision is within the 
zone of reasonableness. Courts are then being asked not to invade that 
zone. From a principled perspective, at least, no other country seems 
to have ventured so far down the deference path on questions of legal 
interpretation. Strong legal and contextual reasons may explain and 
justify some landmark cases in both countries. Nevertheless, does a 
presumption of deference adequately reflect the role of the courts in an 
État de droit when it applies to questions of law? Do courts infer too 
much, institutionally speaking, from the ambiguity of statutes? In 
short, should a more nuanced approach, for instance along the lines of 
this Article,295 be preferred? Such an approach might actually better 
protect the Parliament of Canada or the Congress of the United 
States.296 
Secondly, procedural safeguards are deemed, in several countries, 
to require full judicial review of the interpretation of the law and its 
application to the facts.297 In other countries, they do not exclude any 
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. Do the 
doctrines developed in Canada and the United States give sufficient 
 
292. Regarding Canada, see DEAN R. KNIGHT, VIGILANCE AND RESTRAINT IN THE 
COMMON LAW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 155 (2018) (“Notably, unlike other Anglo-
Commonwealth jurisdictions, . . . deference also applies explicitly to questions of law—
that is, resolving matters of interpretation is not regarded as being the sole 
constitutional preserve of the courts.”). Regarding Canada and the United States, see 
Boughey, supra note 43, at 37 n.16. 
293. See supra Parts III.C, VI.B. 
294. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
295. See the test proposed infra Part VII. 
296. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
297. See supra Parts V.D, VI.A. 
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weight to judicial independence and fairness? 298  This question is 
delicate and cannot probably be answered in abstracto. Arguably, it 
should instead be examined on a case-by-case basis or, at least, on a 
procedure-by-procedure basis. The case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights is, mutatis mutandis, interesting in this respect.299 The 
test proposed in the conclusion of this Article allows for such an 
approach. 
Thirdly, are all “ambiguous” or “unclear” statutory norms equal 
under the various doctrines of deference? This question is perhaps 
provocative, but it aims to invite, here again, a nuanced approach. It is 
argued, in this Article, that judicial deference should especially relate 
to those among said norms requiring non-legal expertise for their 
interpretation, 300  especially when the making of a prediction, 
appraisal, or assessment lies at their core.301 This approach closely 
follows the reasoning in the Chevron and Mead decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States302 and the Vavilov decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada,303 though it would reduce the breadth of 
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. In the 
test proposed in the conclusion of this Article, the asymmetry of non-
legal expertise is not the starting point of the analysis, but rather a 
subsequent element for the courts to consider on a nuanced basis. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation 
arises in some democracies. Some courts have developed a doctrine in 
this respect; others have explicitly rejected any idea of deference with 
regard to the interpretation of the law. It is possible that the first defer 
 
298. For a positive answer, see Daly, supra note 264, at 145–47. For a rather 
negative answer, see Hamburger, supra note 57, at 1251 (“In the end, it must be hoped 
that the judges themselves will solve the dangers of deference. Although they 
undoubtedly will continue to enjoy the robes of their office, they need to decide whether 
they will fill those robes. Under the Constitution, they must exercise an office of 
independent judgment and must avoid systematic bias in violation of due process, and if 
they fail to meet these most basic requirements, they will have little right to public 
respect or even self-respect.”). 
299. See supra Part V.D. 
300. Regarding the United States, see SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 260, at 
137–38 (referring, by analogy, to the Kisor decision, according to which “the agency’s 
interpretation must in some way implicate its substantive expertise.” 139 S. Ct. 2400, 
2417 (2019)). 
301. See supra Part VI.C.2. 
302. “Steps zero, one and two” of the Chevron/Mead doctrine can be linked to 
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of the test proposed infra Part VII (“step zero” results in 
particular from condition (iii)). 
303. The standard of review imposed on a court and the limits imposed by the rule 
of law especially result from condition (iii) of the test proposed infra Part VII. 
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less than they are supposed to, according to their own doctrine, and 
that the second actually defer consciously or unconsciously. One of the 
great merits of a doctrine, such as the ones existing in Canada, 
Germany, and the United States, is to raise an issue and to open or 
frame a debate. 
Judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation may 
be regarded as a pragmatic and realistic way of allocating limited 
resources and of dealing with the asymmetry of non-legal expertise 
among administrative bodies and courts, provided that it is framed by 
several conditions. When these conditions are met, the separation of 
powers principle is not endangered, and judicial deference in statutory 
interpretation cases may be described as oil in the complex machinery 
of checks and balances.304 In any event, the legislature retains the final 
say,305 at least ex post and pro futuro. 
The legislature may explicitly or actively require or allow judicial 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Courts still have 
to verify that the legislature has not violated the constitution or 
international law in countries where the supremacy of the one or the 
other over statutes is legally enforceable. They have to interpret this 
authorization in order to determine its scope as well as the intensity of 
judicial review that may or must be performed. 
As statutes rarely deal with the issue of judicial deference to their 
interpretation, courts themselves must determine whether such 
deference is permitted or forbidden, generally or in certain cases only. 
The constitutional, legal, and judicial context prevailing in each 
country is of great significance in this regard. It may nevertheless 
provide courts with little, if any, guidance on the specific issue of 
deference to administrative statutory interpretation and leave them 
helpless. In this respect, courts may eventually consider adopting a 
nuanced approach and applying all or part of the following test: When 
(i) in light of the applicable methods and canons of construction, a 
statute allows a margin of interpretation, (ii) the administrative 
interpretation of the statute remains within this margin, and (iii) the 
applicable international, constitutional, statutory, or other constraints 
permit or, at least, do not exclude judicial deference either generally or 
in the case at hand, then courts may or, depending on the country, 
must defer to the administrative interpretation of the statute, 
especially when or, depending on the country, provided that (iv) this 
interpretation requires non-legal expertise, (v) the administrative 
 
304. From a broader—i.e., not focused on statutory interpretation—and 
comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 16, at 15 (“[Judicial deference to the 
administration] is an integral part of the constitutional system, which brings flexibility 
in the arteriosclerotic separation of powers system, balances the lack of political 
legitimacy of the courts as well as the lack of expertise when it is at stake.”). 
305. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Sunstein, supra note 60, at 
1634–41; see also Reitz, supra note 4, at 287. 
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body enjoys an asymmetry of such expertise as compared to courts, and 
(vi) the legislature was or should have been aware of both this 
necessity and this asymmetry. Depending on how condition (iii) is 
interpreted in a given country, courts could disregard condition (vi). 
The level of courts’ expertise in the relevant subject matter should in 
principle be determined after taking account of the measures available 
to judges, including the appointment of experts. The proposed test may 
notably be followed when the disputed statute interpretation requires 
the making of a prediction, appraisal or assessment. 
 
